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Abstract 
This thesis consists of four essays. The first essay looks at pollution taxation under 
capital mobility, and analyzes the role of pre-commitment by countries to their 
pollution tax rate. A polluting firm sells its product in two countries, and can locate 
and produce in a single country or in both countries. Due to the discrete-choice nature 
of the firm's location problem, the countries' welfare functions are discontinuous in 
their pollution tax rate. We show that when the countries cannot pre-commit to their 
pollution tax, the firm can still engender tax competition between them by 
strategically locating in both the countries. Moreover, pre-commitment pollution 
taxation may not be welfare improving for the countries, although it always makes 
the firm better off. 
The second essay studies the effect ofliberalization on corruption. Corruptible 
inspectors enforce an environmental regulation on firms, and are monitored by an 
honest regulator. Liberalization not only increases the variety of goods and the 
marginal utility of accepting a bribe, but also puts pressure on the regulator to curb 
corruption. The interaction of these two effects can cause corruption to initially 
increase with liberalization, and then decrease beyond a threshold. Moreover, 
equilibrium corruption is lower when the regulator is able to pre-commit to her 
monitoring frequency. 
The third essay analyzes optimallabeling (information revelation) procedures 
for hidden attributes of credence goods. Consumers are heterogeneous in their 
preference for the hidden attribute, and producers can either self-label their products, 
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or have them certified by a third party. The government can impose self or third-party 
labeling requirements on either the "green" or the "brown" producers. When corrupt 
producers can affix spurious labels, the government needs to monitor them. A 
mandatory self-Iabeling policy is shown to generally domiilate mandatory third-party 
labeling. 
The fourth essay develops formulas for computing the economy-wide energy 
intensity decline rate by aggregating sectoral energy efficiency improvements, and 
sectoral shifts in economic activities. The formulas are used to (i) construct plausible 
scenarios for the global rate of energy intensity decline, and (ii) show the restraining 
role ofthe "electricity generation" sector on the energy intensity decline rate. 
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Résumé 
Cette thèse se compose de quatre parties. La première partie concerne la taxation de 
pollution en cas de mobilité des capitaux. Elle examine le rôle d'engagement des pays 
sur leurs taux de taxation. Prenant le cas d'une firme qui vend ses produits dans les 
deux pays et peut se localiser dans l'un ou les deux pays, nous montrons qu'en raison 
de la nature de choix- discret de la localisation de la firme, la fonction de bien-être 
des pays est discontinue dans le taux de taxation. Nous montrons également que 
l'engagement peut ne pas améliorer le bien-être des pays, bien qu'il bénéficie 
toujours à la firme. 
La deuxième partie examine les effets de la libéralisation sur la corruption. La 
régulation environnementale est mise en œuvre par les employés corrompus qui 
agissent sous la direction d'un régulateur honnête. La libéralisation augmente la 
variété des produits, et l'utilité marginale de la corruption, mais en même temps met 
la pression sur le régulateur pour combattre la corruption. L'interaction entre ses deux 
effets cause l'augmentation de la corruption dans en premier temps et sa diminution 
par la suite. Nous montrons que le niveau d'équilibre de la corruption après la 
libéralisation est plus bas si le régulateur réussit à s'engager sur la fréquence de ses 
vérifications. 
La troisième partie analyse étiquetage optimal des produits pour révéler la 
vraie information sur leur «crédibilité». Les consommateurs sont hétérogènes par 
rapport à leurs dispositions à payer pour ces attributs cachés (crédibilité) et les 
producteurs peuvent procéder à l'étiquetage par eux-mêmes ou faire appel à un tiers. 
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Le gouvernement impose l'étiquetage et les producteurs corrompus vont introduire 
des étiquettes superflues. Nous montrons qu'une politique de l'étiquetage par les 
producteurs eux-mêmes domine l'étiquetage par un tiers. 
La dernière partie développe des formules pour le calcul de taux de réduction 
de l'intensité énergétique agrégée en tenant compte des améliorations d'efficacité 
énergétiques sectorielles. Nous avons utilisé ces formules pour, premièrement, 
construire des scénarios plausibles sur le taux de réduction de l'intensité énergétique 
globale, et ensuite, pour montrer le rôle limité du secteur électrique dans cette 
réduction. 
v 
Acknowledgements 
Foremost, 1 would like to gratefully acknowledge the caring guidance and support 
provided by my supervisor, Ngo Van Long. His timely comments have helped me 
improve my work on numerous occasions. 
1 have been very fortunate to have the opportunity to work with my co-authors 
Chris Green and Pinaki Bose. Not only did they introduce me to the areas of energy 
and corruption, their enthusiasm and perceptiveness have made working with them an 
enjoyable and enriching experience. 
1 have also benefited from discussions with Robert Cairns, Hassan 
Benchekroun, and Anthony Heyes. Linda, Elaine, Edith, Lisa, Helen, and Michelle 
have always ensured smooth sailing for me in administrative matters. 
Amrita has helped me immensely on various occasions. Her encouragement 
and editing assistance helped me complete this thesis. Maryam assisted with the 
French translation of the abstract. Bodhi, Alex, Sumit, Andy, Suraj, Arun, Surjoda, 
Bonny, Sohini, Sanjayda, and Raja contributed in various ways during the course of 
my graduate studies. 
My parents and sisters have inspired, supported and comforted me in too 
many ways to express. 
1 thank them aIl. Financial assistance from the Government of Canada and 
Dalbir Bindra McGiIl Major Fellowship is also thankfully acknowledged. 
vi 
Contributions of Authors 
The second and third essays of this thesis are based on research done jointly with 
Pinaki Bose (University of Memphis), whom 1 met while he was visiting McGiIl 
University. 
For the second essay, 1 reviewed the literature, specified the model (including 
the numerical example) and analyzed the section "Monitoring and Bribery". The 
analysis of the section on "Corruption Without Deterrence" was do ne jointly. 
For the third essay, 1 initiated the idea, reviewed the literature, and set up the 
framework. The detailed analysis was collaborative. 
The fourth essay is part of a longer paper co-authored with Chris Green 
(McGill University). The part included in the thesis consists of the overall energy 
intensity formulas that 1 specified, and the energy intensity decline scenarios that 
were constructed jointly. 
vii 
Contents 
Abstract. ........................................................................................ .ii 
Résumé .......................................................................................... .iv 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................ vi 
Contributions of Authors .................................................................... vii 
Table of Contents ............................................................................ viii 
List of Tables .................................................................................... xi 
L · fF' .. lst 0 19ures .................................................................................. Xll 
Introduction ..................................................................................... 1 
1. Pollution Taxation under Capital Mobility: Strategie Location Decision 
of a Polluting Firm, and the Role of Policy Commitment 
1.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 7 
1.2 The Model and Preliminaries ............................ '" ........................ 15 . 
1.3 First Move by Firm under Time Consistent Tax ................................. 17 
1.3.1 Stage two: Taxation under Three Alternative Cases ..................... 18 
1.3.2 Stage One: Location Decision of the Firm ................................ 27 
1.3.3 Firm Location and Global Welfare: Normative Analyses .............. 32 
1.4 First Move by Countries under Pre-Commitment tax .......................... .34 
1.5 First Move by Countries under Lump-Sum Subsidy ........................... .36 
1.6 First Move by Countries under Lump-Sum Subsidy and Pre-Commitment 
Tax ................................................................................... :.40 
1.7 Conclusion ............................................................................ 46 
Vlll 
2. The Effect of Liberalization on Corruption when Monitoring is Endogenous 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................... 55 
2.2 Corruption without Deterrence ..................................................... 60 
2.3 Monitoring and Bribery ............................................................. 64 
2.3.1 Monitoring with Pre-Commitment ......................................... 67 
2.3.2 Monitoring without Pre-Commitment ..................................... 70 
2.3.3 Discussion ..................................................................... 73 
2.4 Conclusion ........................................................................... 76 
3. Efficient Labeling Policies for Credence Goods: Who Should Pay? 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................... 78 
3.2 First Best Outcome: Complete Information ...................................... 85 
3.3 Incomplete Information with Truthful Labeling ................................. 89 
3.4 Incomplete Information with Cheating and Monitoring ........................ 94 
3.4.1 Three labeling Options ...................................................... 95 
3.4.2 Third Party Labeling by Green vs. Brown Firms ........................ 98 
3.4.3 Self-Labeling vs. Third Party Labeling by Brown Firms .............. 100 
3.4.4 Self-Labeling vs. Third Party Labeling by Green Firms ............... l0l 
3.5 Numerical Example ................................................................ 103 
3.6 Conclusion ........................................................................... 104 
4. Exact Methods for Calculating the Ove raIl Energy Intensity Decline Rate 
from Sectoral Improvements in Energy Efficiency 
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................... 106 
4.2 Ca1culating the Overall Energy Intensity Decline Rate ........................ 110 
IX 
4.3 Future Energy Intensity Decline Scenarios ..................................... 113 
4.4 Conclusion ........................................................................ ... 116 
Conclusion ..................................................... .............................. . 125 
References .................................................................................... 130 
x 
List of Tables 
Table 1.1: Equilibrium when countries use tax only ................................. 53 
Table 1.2: Equilibrium when countries use both tax and lump sum subsidy ...... 54 
Table 4.1: Global Energy Intensity Decline Estimate .............................. 118 
Table 4.2: Sensitivity Analyses: Likely (A, B & C) and 
Unlikely (D, F & G) Scenarios ............................................ 119 
Table 4.3: Sensitivity Analysis: Very Large Energy Efficiency 
Improvements in Downstream End-use Sectors ........................ 120 
Table 4.5: . 1990 GDP Shares for the Energy End-use Sectors ..................... 124 
Xl 
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1: Consumer Surplus (CS), Tax Revenue (TR) and Pollution 
Damage (PD) with single-country production (Case A) ................ .49 
Figure 1.2: Consumer Surplus (CS), Tax Revenue (TR) and Pollution Damage 
(PD) with two-country production (Case B) .............................. 50 
Figure 1.3: First move by Firm under ex -post optimal tax ........................... 51 
Figure 1.4: First move by Countries using subsidy under ex-post optimal tax ..... 52 
Xll 
Introduction 
Environmental policy formulation and implementation have been a major focus in 
recent years both amongst academic researchers and policymakers. This coming into 
focus has ·been caused by two worldwide and growing phenomena. For one, 
increasing environmental consciousness among citizens has forced politicians to act 
both at the local and global levels. This bottom-up force to act has at times been 
accompanied by a top-down pressure. Action at the national/local level has 
sometimes been initiated in order to live up to commitments made at the global level 
(for example, Canada and the Kyoto Protocol). Secondly, sorne governments have 
used environmental policies for strategic reasons such as to attract foreign 
investment, and to offer protection to domestic tirms against foreign competitors. The 
tendency to use environmental policy as a secondary means of protection has grown 
as international free-trade agreements have progressively reduced national 
governments' ability to use traditional protectionist tools such as tariffs, quotas, and 
export subsidies. 
Economists have responded by redoubling their research on both the 
formulation of environmental policies, as weil as the challenges facing their proper 
implementation. My thesis, consisting of four essays which examine various aspects 
of environmental policy formulation and implementation, contributes to this 
endeavour. 
The context ofmy tirst essay is pollution taxation under capital mobility. The 
impact of their tax regime on location decision of tirms is an important con cern to 
1 
governments, which fear losing investments to other jurisdictions with more 
"competitive" tax regimes. This con cern is the reason behind "race-to-the-bottom" 
tax competition that often takes place between jurisdictions when they act non-
cooperatively. The way in which the existing literature has typically modeled this 
situation is by assuming that jurisdictions can credibly pre-commit to their tax rate. 
This enables the jurisdictions to move first, and engage in tax competition, before the 
firm takes its location decision. However, pre-commitment by countries may not 
always be possible (for example, if their reputation costs are low). Markusen, et al. 
(1995) and Hoel (1997) studied competition among jurisdictions, in terms of their 
pollution tax, in order to attract a polluting firm. They found that the resulting market 
structure and pollution level depends on the various parameter values in their models. 
However, they too assumed pre-commitment possibility on the part of the countries. 
ln my first essay, 1 analyze a similar situation where countries compete for a polluting 
firm, but may not be able to pre-commit to their pollution tax rate. In this context, 1 
show that the firm can use its location decision strategically in order to obtain a lower 
pollution tax from the countries. Moreover, pre-commitment may not be welfare 
improving for the countries. 
The second essay also analyzes the role of pre-commitment but in a context 
where a corruptible bureaucracy enforces an environmental regulation on firms. The 
literature on corruption has theoretically posited a negative association between 
competition and corruption (e.g. Becker and Stigler, 1974; Rose-Ackerman, 1975, 
1978; Mauro, 1995). This association works in both directions. On one hand, corrupt 
public officiais seek to create impediments to the operation of free markets (such as 
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licenses, permits, and taxes) in order to generate opportunities for rent-seeking 
activities. On the other hand, greater competition reduces monopolistic rents enjoyed 
by firms, thus reducing their ability to pay a bribe to the officiais. This negative 
association with corruption is posited to apply not only to competition in general, but 
also to openness to trade and investment in particular (e.g. Wei, 2000b). The search 
for empirical support for this inverse association has, however, yielded mixed results 
(e.g. Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Wei, 2000a, 2000b; Knack and Afzar, 2003; Triesman, 
2000). In fact, journalistic and anecdotal evidences have sometimes suggested a non-
monotonie relation between liberalization and corruption, especially for transition 
economies (e.g. Transparency International, 2005). 
If trade liberalization also increases the variety of goods, can this increase the 
marginal utility of accepting a bribe? The second essay, explores this new channel 
through which liberalization may positively affect corruption among inspectors who 
are charged with enforcing an environmental regulation among firms. A second effect 
of opening up to foreign trade and investment is that corruption in the domestie 
country beeomes more internationally "visible", and international players are able to 
exert a greater pressure on the domestic government to crack down on corruption. 
The combined impact of these two opposing effects eould lead to a non-monotonie 
relation between liberalization and corruption. Moreover, by pre-committing to its 
anti-corruption policy, the government will be able to not only detect more corrupt 
inspectors, but also reduce the inspeetors' incentive to be corrupt in the first place. 
In the third essay, corruption again plays a role. Here we analyze dishonest 
behaviour by firms rather than public officiais. Many produets are vertically 
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differentiated in terms of characteristics that are observable to producers but not to 
consumers. Examples of such "credence goods" are recycled paper and genetically 
modified food. Since consumers are heterogeneous in terms of their environmental 
consciousness, they are willing to paya varying premium for the "greener" variety or 
type of such goods. However, consumers cannot make an informed choice while 
purchasing credence goods unless they are informed about the hidden attribute they 
care for. Since the "green" type is commonly more costly to produce, no firm would 
have an incentive to produce the green type if it sold at a price equal to or lower than 
the other ("brown") type. On the other hand, if the green type sold at a higher price 
than the brown, all firms producing the brown type would want to pretend to be 
green. There cannot then be an equilibrium where differences in price signal the 
different types. Consequently, no firm would find it profitable to produce the green 
type at a higher cost. 
It is in this context that eco-Iabeling serves as a mechanism for the disclosure 
of information that enables the green types to differentiate themselves, and the 
consumers to exercise their preferences for the hidden attribute of a credence good. 
Such disclosure strategies to increase information on the environmental friendliness 
of products have often been called the "third wave" in environmental policy (the 
"first wave" being legal remedies such as liability laws and emission standards, and 
the "second wave" being market-based instruments such as pollution taxes and 
emission trading) (Tietenberg, 1998). 
Two ways in which eco-labeling can be implemented are self-Iabeling by the 
firms themselves (cheap talk), and third party labeling involving a certifying agency 
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(costly signaling). However, ev en with labeling, corrupt firms producing the brown 
type will try to circumvent the labeling process and pass off as green (for example, by 
making false claims or using spurious labels), in order to bene fit from the higher 
priee of the green type. Hence the government will have to undertake monitoring 
activities in order to ensure that the labeling process is accurate. My third essay 
analyzes optimallabeling policies in such a context. 
The fourth essay examines a key aspect of the global climate change problem: 
the rate of decline in energy intensity of output over time. Energy intensity is defined 
as energy used per unit (real dollar) of output. It is increasingly widely understood 
that anthropogenically induced climate change, caused by the accumulation of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, is essentially an energy problem. The 
combustion of fossil fuels for energy purposes is the chief source of carbon dioxide 
emissions, the main greenhouse gas. The concentration of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide has increased from its pre-Industrial Revolution level of275 ppmv (parts per 
million by volume) to about 375 ppmv in 2000, and is predicted to rise a lot further 
over the course of the 21 st century. The positive relationship between anthropogenic 
carbon dioxide emissions and energy intensity is shown by the Kaya Identity (Kaya, 
1989). 
As noted by Hoffert et al. (1998, 2002), estimating the future rate of global 
energy intensity decline is important for determining the amount of carbon-emission-
free power that would be required for limiting the rise in atmospheric carbon 
concentration. It would also aid the construction of future greenhouse gas emission 
5 
scenarios, such as those done by the United Nations' Intergovemmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC, 2000). 
The fourth essay specifies formulas for computing the rate of decline in 
energy intensity for an economy by appropriately aggregating its various 
determinants. These formulas are then used to construct global energy intensity 
decline scenarios for the 2I S! century, and to show the crucial role played by the 
"electricity generation" sector. 
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Chapter 1 
Pollution Taxation under Capital Mobility: 
Strategie Location Decision of a Polluting Firm, and the 
Role of Poliey Commitment 
1.1 Introduction 
That transboundary pollution across countries will lead to market failure on an 
international scale is generally weil appreciated.\ What is less weil understood is the 
role strictly local pollution can play to distort markets at the global level. Two ways 
in which local pollution can have an international dimension are as follows. Firstly, 
countries can reduce environmental norms or standards in order to give their domestic 
firms an advantage over their foreign rivais. Such secondary means of protection are 
becoming more attractive as international free-trade agreements progressively reduce 
the ability of countries to use traditional instruments such as tariffs, quotas, and 
export subsidies. A second way local pollution can cause global distortions is when 
polluting capital is internationally mobile. 
The first way of providing competitive advantage to domestic firms by 
lowering environmental standards is often called "environmental dumping". 
Analytically, the logic for environmental dumping is similar to the one for providing 
1 Recall, for example, multilateral environmental agreements like the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols, 
which try to address this problem. 
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a rent-shifting export subsidy to a domestic firm in Brander and Spencer's (1985) 
strategie trade policy model. A number of studies have extended Brander and 
Spencer's model (which had no negative externality) by ineorporating a negative 
externality from pollution, spawning the so-ealled strategie environmental poliey 
literature (see, for example, Barrett, 1994 and Kennedy, 1994.). Using a two-country, 
two-firm framework with one firm loeated in eaeh country, Cournot competition 
among firms, and ail output sold in a "third market", these models show that eaeh 
country will have a strategie incentive to reduee the pollution tax it imposes on its 
domestie firm to an inefficient level (where marginal abatement cost is less than 
marginal damage from pollution) so that the domestic firm is able to capture a larger 
share of the international market? Three crucial assumptions of the se models are: (i) 
there is imperfect competition in the product market; (H) location of the domestie 
firm in each country is exogenously fixed, so that if a country reduces its pollution 
tax, the foreign firm cannot move to that country; and (iii) the profit of the domestic 
firm enters each country's welfare. 
When capital is mobile across countries, the location decision of a firm 
becomes endogenous. In such case, two eountries can also compete among 
themselves in order to attract the mobile firms to locate in their territory. The 
literature on such international tax competition concludes that since neither country 
internalizes the fiscal externality involved (an increase in tax by one country benefits 
the other country through capital outflow from the first to the second country), both 
countries will set excessively low taxes. Typically, however, the international tax 
2 Barrett (1994) also contains an extension of Eaton and Grossman's (1986) result: with Bertrand 
competition among firms, the countries will strategically impose "strong" environmental standards on 
their domestic firm. 
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competition literature assumes that (i) the product market is perfectly competitive, 
and that (ii) the tax is collected to finance the provision of sorne public good, and not 
to correct the negative externality of pollution (see, for example, Bond and 
Samuelson, 1989). 
The key reason for countries to compete among themselves is, thus, different 
in the strategie trade literature and the international tax competition literature. In the 
former, it is the presence of imperfect competition in the product market that allows 
countries to shift rent from the foreign to the domestic firm by subsidizing the latter. 
In the international tax competition literature, on the other hand, the reason for tax 
competition among countries is mobility of capital. When both imperfect competition 
and capital mobility (assuming a mobile firm's profit goes not to the country where it 
locates, but to its owners whose location is fixed) are present, Janeba (1998) shows 
that competition among countries will be less as they will neither subsidize nor tax 
their firms. However, the firms in Janeba's model are not polluting. 
Tax competition among countries when there is imperfect competition in the 
product market, and capital is both mobile and polluting has been studied by 
Markusen, et al. (1993, 1995), Motta and Thisse (1994), Hoel (1997), and Ulph and 
Valentini (2001) among others.3 The general result that emerges from these models is 
that when production causes pollution, then the countries have to choose between 
more production versus more pollution, and the resulting non-cooperative Nash 
equilibrium is not Pareto optimal. When disutility from pollution is small, "race to the 
bottom" tax competition between the countries will take place, while when pollution 
3 Copeland and Scott Taylor (1997) have studied the effect of capital mobility on pollution in a non-
strategie setting using a Heckscher-Ohlin type trade model. 
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disutility is large the countries will impose prohibitive taxes so as to drive out the 
firm ("Not in My Backyard"). 
Using a two-region, two-firm model, where each firm can set up a plant in 
either one or both regions, Markusen, et al. (1993) additionally show that when plant 
location is endogenous, the resulting market structure depends not only on parameters 
like plant-specifie fixed cost and transportation cost, but also on the level of pollution 
tax. Pollution tax in their model is, however, exogenous. Markusen, et al. (1995) 
endogenize pollution tax chosen by countries acting non-cooperatively. Using a two-
region one-firm mode l, where the firm can choose to set up a plant in either one or 
both reg ions, they show that the non-cooperative pollution tax, and the resulting 
market structure, depends on the disutitity of pollution. Unlike Markusen et al., Hoel 
(1997) assumes priee competition among firms, but reaches a similar conclusion that 
the non-cooperative pollution tax can be lower or higher than the cooperative 
pollution tax depending on the disutility of pollution. However, both Markusen, et al. 
and Hoel assume that countries make the first move, and choose their pollution tax 
rate, before the firm takes its location decision. Thus, they implicitly assumed that 
countries are able to credibly pre-commit to their pollution tax. 
Pre-commitment by countries, however, may not always be credible to the 
firms. A related issue that has been addressed in the literature concerns the time 
consistency of public environmental policies such as an emission tax or standard, 
which affect the production decision of firms. Since a firm's decision to locate or 
invest in (cost reducing) R&D activities is a long-term decision, white its production 
decision is a short-term one, we can think of the firm as taking these decisions 
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sequentially - it first takes its long-term decision before taking its short-term 
decision. Due to this sequential nature of the firm' s decision-making, the precise 
timing of a government's environmental policy becomes crucial to the outcome of a 
game. In particular, an ex-ante4 optimal environmental policy, which is set by the 
government before the firm takes its long-term decision, will not be ex-post optimal 
afier that decision has been taken, as the policy can no longer influence the firm's 
long-term decision. Hence, a government will have an incentive to change its ex-ante 
optimal environmental policy, after the firm has taken its long-term decision. Unless 
the govemment possesses specific commitment mechanisms (for example, reputation 
costs) for adhering to announced policies even after they become sub-optimal, its ex-
ante environmental policy williack credibility with the firm. 
Pre-commitment possibility by a government affects the sequence of moves in 
agame. It is only when the govemment is able to credibly pre-commit to its 
announced policy, can it move first (before the firm takes its long-term decision) 
using that policy. The role ofmove structures has been studied by Ulph and Valentini 
(2001), and Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2001, 2003). Using a two-country, two-firm 
mode l, where firms are free to locate in either the same or different countries, Ulph 
and Valentini (2001) compare the extent of environmental dumping for two 
alternative games. When the countries set emission standards after the firms locate, 
they play a "market share game", while when they set the standards before the firms 
locate, they play a "location game". The emission standard set in the market share 
game is generally lower than that set in the location game. However, when pollution 
4 Neary (1991) introduced the terms "ex-ante" to refer to the pre-commitment policy, and "ex-post" for 
the time consistent policy. 
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intensity is large and the fixed cost is intermediate, the emission standard in the 
market share game is larger than that in the location game. Petrakis and Xepapadeas 
(2001, 2003) model the game of a monopolist trying to decide whether to stay and 
produce in its home country, which imposes a pollution tax, or to relocate to a foreign 
country, which has no such tax. Relocation involves a sunk cost. The firm also 
undertakes an abatement effort (R&D), which reduces the emission intensity of 
output. Even if the firm relocates to the foreign country, it keeps selling in the home 
country (there is no tariff or transportation cost), but its profit now goes to the foreign 
country. In this setting, the authors show that when the home country follows a time-
consistent policy, the optimal emission tax is lower, while innovation, profits and 
welfare are generally higher vis-à-vis the pre-commitment policy. Moreover, the 
monopolist relocates more often under the time-consistent policy. Petrakis and 
Xepapadeas (2001) also show that these monopoly results extend to the case of an 
oligopoly with a few firms, but not to an oligopoly with a large number offirms. 
When capital is immobile across jurisdictions, Ulph (1996) has shown that 
firms will have an incentive to behave strategically in terms of their research and 
development (R&D) expenditure, which lowers their production cost. Using a two-
country, two-firm model where firm location is fixed, he shows that strategie R&D 
expenditure by firms reduces the strategie incentive for countries to relax their 
environmental policy. Since pollution can be reduced by either incurring abatement 
cost or by reducing output, the firms will produce and pollute up to the point where 
marginal abatement cost equals marginal 10ss of profit from an additional unit of 
output. When R&D expenditure by firms increases their profit, the equilibrium 
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involves higher output and emissions. Ulph further shows that (i) strategic behavior 
by countries and firms is more when governments use emission taxes rather than 
standards, and (ii) welfare (ignoring consumer surplus) is lower when both countries 
and firms act strategically rather than when only one ofthem does so. 
This paper looks at pollution taxation under imperfect competition and capital 
mobility in a two-country one-firm set up (a la Markusen, et al. 1995), and analyzes 
the role of pre-commitment. The firm sells its good in the two countries, and has to 
decide whether to set up a plant in one country or in both countries. If the firm 
pro duces in a single country, it can costlessly export half of its output to the other 
country (since markets are not segmented). Production generates local pollution, 
which is taxed by the countries, and pollution damage is convex in output.5 We show 
that when the countries cannot pre-commit to their pollution tax rate, and have to rely 
on time consistent taxation instead, the firm can use its location decision strategically. 
Specifically, the firm can set up plants in both countries in order to reduce the "rent 
capture effect" of the tax - the higher fixed cost involved may be compensated by the 
lower tax rate.6 Although location can play a strategic role Iike R&D (as in Ulph, 
1996), unlike R&D, location is a discrete (binary) variable. Consequently, the 
countries' welfare functions are discontinuous in the pollution tax rate. A small 
reduction in the tax by either country causes the firm to shift its entire production to 
that country, and this leads to discrete jumps in profit and welfare levels. This 
5 Thus three differences from Markusen, et al. (1995) are that they assume the existence of a linear 
transportation cost, an export tax, and a constant marginal disutility of pollution. Despite the fixed 
cost, the firm might locate in both countries for different reasons in our models: to save on 
transportation cost in Markusen, et al. 's model, and to save on pollution tax, in our mode!. Moreover, 
Markusen, et al. do not analyze the role played by pre-commitment. 
6 To focus on this tradeoff, we assume a constant marginal cost of production in our mode!. 
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discontinuity limits the application of traditional marginal analysis used in Pigouvian 
taxes. On the other hand, when the countries can pre-commit to their pollution tax 
rates, location no longer serves a strategic purpose for the firm. 
A second contribution of this paper is to compare the welfare implications of 
a pre-commitment and a time consistent pollution tax policy. We show that pre-
commitment tax policy may not be welfare improving for the countries, although it 
always benefits the firm. The key difference made by pre-commitment is that it 
instigates tax competition between the countries, even before the firm takes its 
location decision. Hence, when taxation is the only policy used by the countries, pre-
commitment mostly makes the countries worse off. 
However, it is possible that the countries may take recourse to a second 
instrument - a lump sum subsidy - in order to attract the firm, especially wh en they 
cannot pre-commit to their tax rate. In practice it is oftentimes observed that countries 
try to attract a foreign firm by offering to bear a part of its fixed costs (for example by 
offering subsidized land or loan). Pre-commitment is easier with respect to such a 
subsidy than with respect to pollution tax.7 This is because the lump sum subsidy is a 
one-time offer made at the time the firm sets up the plant (its long-term decision), and 
does not affect its short-term production decision. On the other hand, the tax is 
imposed on emissions (or polluting output), which takes place after the firm sets up 
its plant and undertakes production. When lump-sum subsidy is used as a second 
instrument, we find that pre-commitment taxation makes the countries better off in 
most cases. This is because when they compete to attract the firm, the countries can 
7 For example, it is legally easier for a new government to revise eurrent tax rates from levels promised 
by its predeeessor than to revise the priee of sorne public land whieh was sold to the firm in the past. 
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only be better off when they use two instruments (lump sum subsidy and pre-
commitment tax) than when they use lump sum subsidy only. 
The rest ofthe paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the model, 
and solves for the optimal output level chosen by the firm in the last (production) 
stage of each game. In sections 1.3 and 1.4, we assume that pollution tax is the only 
instrument used by the countries to attract the firm. In section 1.3 the countries cannot 
pre-commit to a tax rate before the firm locates, and hence set a time consistent (i.e. 
ex-post optimal) tax after the firm locates. Section 1.4 analyzes the equilibrium when 
the countries are able to pre-commit to their pollution tax rate. In sections 1.5 and 1.6 
we assume that the countries use two instruments - a lump sum subsidy and a 
pollution tax. While in section 1.5 the countries set a time consistent tax (because 
they cannot pre-commit), in section 1.6 they are able to pre-commit and set an ex-
ante optimal tax. Section 1.7 concludes. 
1.2 The Model and Preliminaries 
Consider a firm and two identical countries, 1 and 2, within a Free Trade Area.8 The 
firm is the monopoly seller of its product in both the countries. However, it has to 
decide whether to produce in one country or in both. Transport costs are assumed to 
be negligible, so that if the firm sets up operation in one country, it will export half of 
its output to the other country. If the firm produces in both countries, the output will 
be sold domestically and there will be no trade. 
8 The setting ofthis model could be interregional as weil, Le. instead oftwo countries we could have 
two provinces within a count!)' . 
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Let the inverse demand function in each country be p = a - bq , where p and 
q denote the priee charged and quantity sold of the commodity, and a and b are 
positive constants. There are economies of scale in production, and total cost C of 
producing q units of output consists of fixed cost F, and constant marginal 
production cost c, i.e. C = F + cq .9 To ensure positive production, we assume that 
the choke price, a, exceeds the marginal cost, c. The fixed cost F could be country-
specifie or plant-specifie, and must be ineurred by the firm before it ean produee in a 
country. Production generates local pollution (or creates a negative externality, in 
general), and consequently the countries impose a tax t per unit of the firm's output. 
Sinee the tax is imposed on output of the polluting good rather than on emission of 
pollution (perhaps due to convenience in measuring the former), the firm will have no 
incentive to undertake abatement activities. Pollution is measured in units such that 
one unit of output generates one unit of pollution. Pollution in country i (i = l, 2) 
reduees its welfare by an amount di which is assumed to be an increasing and convex 
function. Specifically, we assume that di = flqi2 , where f3 E [0,00) is a parameter 
which reflects the intensity of pollution damage. A higher value of f3 signifies a 
more harmful pollutant. When f3 = 0, the firm produces a clean good. Note that since 
marginal damage cost is negligible at very low levels of output (Le. d;(q) ~ 0, when 
q ~ 0), it is always optimal to produce positive output as long as a > c .1 0 
9 The assumption of decreasing average cost allows us to focus on the interaction between economies 
of scale and convex pollution damage. 
10 This also rules out the NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) result, where the two countries competitively 
rai se taxes so as to drive away the firm from producing in either country, from our model. 
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When it chooses output in the last stage, the firm takes the tax rate t as given. 
Since the countries are identical and there are no tariff or transport cost, priees and 
output sold in each country will be the same. Suppose the firm se Ils q units of the 
output in each country. The firm's operating profit (Le. profit gross of fixed cost) 
from selling in the two countries, then, is II = 2( a - bq - c - t)q. The first order 
condition (FOC) gives the profit maximizing level of output as 
• a-c-( a-t 
q = 2b =-v;-' (l.l) 
where a == a - c > 0 by assumption. The second order condition (SOC) for profit 
maximizations is also satisfied as b > O. Substituting equation (1.1) into the profit 
function gives the maximized operating profit of the firm as II' = 2b(q')2 . 
1.3 First Move by Firm under Time-Consistent Tax 
In this section we assume that the countries cannot pre-commit to their pollution tax, 
which is the only instrument used by them. This game unfolds as follows: the firm 
locates first, after that the two countries simultaneously choose their optimal tax rate, 
and lastly the firm produces. To obtain the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, we 
solve this (and ail other) game(s) backwards. Since the last stage of production has 
already been solved above, we move to the second stage of taxation. 
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1.3.1 Stage Two: Taxation under Three Alternative Cases 
When it moves first, the firm can locate in either one country or both countries. If the 
firm locates in one country, there is no tax competition amongst the countries as the 
countries, unable to pre-commit, choose only an ex-post optimal tax rate. Let us 
denote this possibility as Case A. Instead, if the firm locates in both countries, the 
countries may or may not compete in pollution tax (depending on conditions given 
below). Let Case B (respectively, Case C) denote the situation where tax competition 
does not (respectively, does) occur, after the firm sets up a plant in both countries. In 
the second stage, the countries choose the tax rate so as to maximize their welfare 
defined as consumer surplus plus tax revenue minus pollution damage. 1 1 Taxation in 
each case is considered below separately. 
Case A: Location in one country 
Since the countries are identical, the firm can locate in either country. Without loss of 
generality, assume that the firm locates in country 1, produces 2qA amount of output 
in that country, and sells halfthe amount in each country. Welfare of countries 1 and 
2 in Case A, denoted respectively by ~A and W2A , are 
(l.AI) 
Il Following Markusen et al. (1995), we ignore the firm's profit while computing each country's 
welfare. This would hold if, for example, the firm was foreign to both the countries. An implication is 
that the countries will no longer have the strategie incentive to subsidize the firm. 
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In the game's second stage, country 1 chooses tA so as to maximize ~A, taking the 
firm's reaction in the subsequent output selection stage as given. Using the FOC (i.e. 
a~A/atA =0) and equation (1.1), we can solve for the optimal choice of tA by 
country 1 as 
t" = _a-,-(3_b +_S--'...fJ--O..) 
A 7b+SfJ (l.A2) 
The SOC is satisfied as a2~A / at~ < O. Equation (l.A2) shows that the pollution tax 
rate t: increases concavely as the pollutant becomes more harmful (Le. as fJ 
increases). Moreover, we have: 
Proposition 1: Even if the firm produces a clean product (i.e. fJ = 0), country 1 will 
impose a positive tax on the product. This is because the tax enables country 1 to 
capture rent from the foreign firm ("rent capture e.ffect ''j. 
Proof: From (1.A2), t: > 0 even when f3 = O. 
Note that in our model there are two sources of market failure: (i) the negative 
externality of pollution, which leads to overproduction, and (ii) imperfect 
competition, which leads to underproduction. The countries therefore face conflicting 
incentives white setting their tax rate. On one hand, correcting the negative 
externality of pollution and capturing rent from the foreign firm requires them to set a 
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higher tax. On the other hand, correcting the underproduction associated with the 
firm's monopoly power requires the tax rate to be lower (or negative, implying a 
production subsidy). Thus country 1 (the country where the firm locates exclusively) 
chooses its optimal tax rate t: such that the sum of the marginal changes in consumer 
surplus, tax revenue and pollution damage equals zero. These opposing incentives are 
represented in Figure LI, which plots country 1 s consumer surplus (CS), tax 
revenue (TR), and pollution damage (PD) as functions of its tax rate tA' Figure LI 
shows that even when f3 = 0 and there is no pollution damage, country 1 will not 
choose a zero tax rate which maximizes only consumer surplus, but will choose a 
positive tax rate which maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and tax revenue. 
Using equations (l.I), (l.AI), and (1.A2) we get the equilibrium output (also, 
pollution) produced and profit earned by the firm, as weil as welfare levels of the two 
countries in Case A: 
• 2a 
qA = 7b+8f3; (1.A3) 
(l.A4) 
Remark: It is interesting to note that white welfare of each country is a decreasing 
function of the pollution damage parameter {J. relative welfare of the country where 
the firm locates exclusively is an increasing function of f3. 
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Note that the relative welfare of country 1, where the firm exclusively locates, is 
w;~ = 7b + 813 ~ 7. This gives the relative order of magnitude of the benefit enjoyed 
W2 b 
by the country with the firm. White both countries enjoy the same consumer surplus, 
country 1 gets a higher welfare than country 2 as the former is able to collect a tax 
revenue which exceeds its damage from pollution. 
Case B: Location in both countries without tax competition 
Case B refers to the situation where the firm locates in both countries, and produces, 
say, qB output in each country. Welfare levels of the two countries in case B are 
equal, Le. 
(1.B 1) 
In the second stage, each country chooses pollution tax rate t B so as to maximize its 
own welfare.12 The FOC and equation 1, gives the optimum tax rate as 
• a(b + 213) 
lB = 3b+2f3 . (1.B2) 
As in Case A, the optimum tax rate in Case B is increasing and concave in the 
damage parameter 13. As weil, each country chooses a positive tax rate even when 
12 The reason why countries may choose not to compete in taxes, even while acting non-cooperatively, 
is addressed in Case C below. Tax competition would also be absent in case the countries collusively 
set their tax rates. 
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the firm produces a non-polluting output. However, t; < t: because the effect of a 
marginal increase in tax rate on tax revenue and pollution damage are less in Case B 
than in Case A (due to the lower level of production in the tax imposing country in 
the former case). Diagrammatically, white the CS curves in cases A and B are 
identical, the TR and PD curves in case A lie above the corresponding curves in case 
B (compare Figures 1.1 and 1.2). This implies that the tax rate which maximizes the 
sum of CS, TR and PD in Case B will be less than that in Case A. Moreover, 
Proposition 2: The rent capture effect of the tax is less when the firm produces in 
both countries, and the countries do not compete in taxes, than when il produces in a 
single country. 
Proof: From equations (1.A2) and (1.B2), when f3 = 0, t; < t~. 
The SOC for welfare maximization is satisfied as a2w;B 1 at~ < O. Equilibrium 
output (pollution), profit and welfare in Case B can be derived, using equations (1.1), 
(l.Bl), and (l.B2), as J3 
• a 
qB = 3b + 2[3; 
2 
w,B = WB = a 
1 2 2(3b + 2[3) 
(I.B3) 
\3 Note that in Case B (as weil as in Case C), the firm locates in both countries and hence has to incur 
the fixed cost twice. 
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Since the tax rate is lower in Case B than in Case A, output sold in each country in 
the former case is higher, i.e. q~ > q:. Moreover, comparing equations (LA4) and 
(LB3), we have ~A > ~8 = W28 > W/. Thus, while each country prefers to have the 
firm exclusively rather than sharing production with the other country, they prefer the 
latter to having no production at ail. 
Case C: Location in both countries with tax competition 
Suppose the firm locates in both countries as in Case B. Further suppose, without loss 
of generality, country 2 reduces its pollution tax rate slightly below t~ as given by 
equation (I.B2), while country 1 continues to impose t~. Specifically, let the neW 
pollution tax imposed by country 2 be td =t; -rjJ, where rjJ is an arbitrarily small 
positive number (subscript d denotes deviation). Then the firm, although it has set up 
a plant in both the countries, will prefer to produce in country 2 only. The output, 
profit and welfare levels in this deviation scenario are as follows: 
a rjJ 
q - + 
d - 3b + 2 {3 2b ' 
2a2b 2arjJ rjJ2 
7r = + +--2F (1 Cl) 
d (3b + 2{3)2 3b + 2{3 2b ,. 
(LC2) 
Comparing profits and welfare levels in this deviation scenario (equations 
I.CI and l.C2) with those in Case B (equation l.B3), we have the following: 
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• 2arjJ rjJ2 
J[ -J[ = +-
d B 3b + 2f3 2b' (l.C3) 
w,d _w,B __ a
2 (b+f3) +L+ arjJ =Z ("') 
1 1 - (3b + 2f3)2 8b 2(3b + 2f3) - 1 If' , (l.C4) 
wd _WB = a
2 (b-f3) _ arjJ(b+4f3) L(7b+8f3)=:Z ("'). 
2 2 (3b + 2f3)2 2b(3b + 2f3) 8b 2 2 If' (l.C5) 
Thus, a marginal reduction of pollution tax by country 2 increases the firm's profit 
and reduces country 1 s welfare. The tax cut also reduces country 2 s welfare if 
f3~b. But if f3<b, a small enough rjJ can be chosen such that W/ -W': >0. To 
distinguish between these two possibilities, let us denote f3 as (i) f3B when f3 2 b, 
and as (ii) f3c wh en f3 < b . 
Remark: Thefunctions ZI and Z2 (defined in equations l.C4 and l.C5), which denote 
the change in welfare of the two countries due to a tax eut of amount rjJ by either 
country, are discontinuous in rjJ at the point rjJ = O. 
Proof: From equations (l.C4) and (l.CS), lim Zj (rjJ) :;t; Zj (0) = 0 for i = 1,2 . 
hO 
When country 2 marginally reduces its tax rate below t;, there are discrete 
changes in the levels of output produced in each country as the firm shifts from two-
country production to one-country production. This in turn causes discrete changes in 
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each country's welfare. The tax cut by country 2 increases output produced in its 
territory, which leads to increases in its consumer surplus, tax revenue14 and pollution 
damage. The first two will have a positive impact on country 2 s welfare, while the 
latter will impact its welfare negatively. When the pollution damage parameter f3 is 
"large" (specifically f3;::: b), the negative impact will outweigh the positive, and 
country 2 will not find it gainful to deviate from I~. Then there will be no tax 
competition between the countries even when they act non-cooperatively, and case B 
will hold. The equilibrium values of the various variables in this no tax competition 
case (Le. case B) will be given by equation (1.B3), but with f3B replacing f3. 
However when f3 < b, the aforementioned positive impact will dominate the 
negative, and country 2 would find it beneficial to reduce its tax rate 12 below I~ in 
order to indu ce the firm to produce only in country 2. Country 1 would then retaliate 
by cutting II below the level set by country 2. Such "race to the bottom" undercutting 
of each other's pollution tax would go on until both countries find it unprofitable to 
cut tax rate any further. This will happen at the pollution tax rate where each country 
is indifferent between having the firm produce exc1usively within its own territory or 
produce exc1usively in the other country. In other words, the tax undercutting will 
stop at the rate II = 12 = I~ where ~bq~ + 21~qc -4f3cq~ = Yzbq~. Solving the latter 
using equation (1.1), we get 
14 Note in Figure 2 that t ~ corresponds to the falling section of the TR curve ("Laffer effect"), as 
~a<t;<a. 
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• af3c t --'--"'--
c - b+ f3
c 
. 
(l.C6) 
At the tax rate t~, the tax revenue exactly equals the pollution damage for single 
country production (Le. 2t~qc = 4 f3cq~ ). Hence neither country will find it beneficial 
to reduce its tax rate below t~. Since in the tax competition case the countries 
compete away any rent they could have captured from the foreign firm, the tax rate 
for this case is the lowest, Le. t~ < t; < t: . Formally, 
Proposition 3: Rent capture effect is zero, and the pollution tax rate is lowest, when 
the firm sets up plants in both countries and "race to the bot/om" tax competition 
between them takes place. 
Proof: From equation (l.C6), t~ = 0 when {Je = O. 
After ( is determined through tax competition, the firm could produce in 
either one country or both countries, earning the same profit in each case. Even if it 
decided to produce in only one country (say, country 1), the firm would not be willing 
to sell its plant in country 2. This is because selling the plant in country 2 would 
induce country 1 to increase its tax rate to the ex-post optimallevel t: .15 Of course, if 
the entire fixed cost F was sunk, the firm would not even be able to sel! its plant in 
country 2. We assume that when it makes no difference to its profits, the firm prefers 
IS Recall we have assumed that the countries cannot commit to their tax rates in this section. 
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to produce in both countries rather than in a single country.16 The equilibrium levels 
of output (pollution), profit and welfare in the tax competition case are as follows: 
(I.C7) 
Since the Case C tax rate is the lowest, the level of output sold in each country is the 
highest, i.e. q~ > q~ > q~. Moreover, from equations (I.A4) and (I.C7), W;A > W,C = 
~C > W/ . Thus, while each country still prefers to have the firm exclusively rather 
than sharing production with the other country, they prefer the latter to having no 
production at ail, even when shared production is accompanied by tax competition. 
1.3.2 Stage One: Location Decision of the Firm 
In the first stage of the game, the firm decides where to locate by comparing its 
anticipated profit in each case A, Band C. Note that in Case A the value of fJ is 
unrestricted. Case B and case C are, on the other hand, mutually exclusive; the former 
holds when fJ"è. b, while for the latter fJ < b. Although t~, q~, Ji ~, W;A and W/ 
will be given by the same formulae (equations I.A2 to I.A4), their values will be 
'6 Producing for the domestic market might be preferred by the firm for reasons such as familiarity 
with local conditions. Moreover, given tax rate (, two-country production gives each country a 
higher level ofwelfare than ifthe firm had produced in a single country. This is because by dividing 
production between the two countries, the firm causes less pollution damage in total. 
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different when P ~ band when P < b .17 When P ~ b, the firrn compares 1Z': and 
1Z';; while when p < b , the relevant comparison is between 1Z': and 1Z'~. 
From equations (1.A3), (1.B3) and (1.C7) we have the following profit 
differentials: 
(1.3.1) 
(1.3.2) 
The variable e(PB) (respectively, m(pd), as defined in equation 1.3.1 (respectively, 
1.3.2), is the difference between operating profit in Case B (respectively, Case C) and 
operating profit in Case A, Le. e = II; - II; > 0 (respectively, m = II~ - II; > 0 ). 
Moreover, e and mare decreasing and convex functions of PB and Pc 
respectively. This is because as the pollution damage parameter P increases, the tax 
rate imposed on the firm increases and its operating profit decreases in aIl three cases, 
but the decrease in operating profit in Case A is less than the decrease in Case B or 
Case C. Diagram 1 represents the situation (the value of Fin Diagram 1 is illustrative 
only). 
17 For example, 7( ~ is greater when f3 < b than when f3 ~ b . Hence we have to compare Cases A and 
B, and Cases A and C separately. 
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B,O) 
Diagram 1 
F 
B 
b Pollution damage parameter, f3 
Recall that O::s; f3e < band f3B 2 b by definition. Substituting f3e = 0 and f3e = b in 
0), we get respectively wmax = 0.3a
2 
/ band wmi" = O.la2 / b as the limits of w. 
Since f3e < b, W of course never reaches Wmin • Again, using f3B = b, we get the 
upper limit of B as Bmax = O.04a2 / b < wmi". 
From equations (1.3.1) and (1.3.2) we have the following result regarding the 
firm's first-stage location decision: 
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Proposition 4: 
(i) Suppose f3 < b. Then if F ~ w(f3), we have 7r: ~ 7r ~, and the firm locates and 
produces in both countries, and tax competition between them takes place (i.e. the 
outcome is Case C). On the other hand, if F > w(f3) , the firm locates and 
produces in a single country as 7r: > 7r~ (i.e. the outcome is Case A). 
(ii) Alternatively, suppose f3 ~ b. If F ~ B(f3) , we have 7r ~ ~ 7r;, and the firm 
locates and produces in both countries, but there is no tax competition between 
them (i.e. the outcome is Case B). However if F > (}(f3) , 7r: > 7r; and the firm 
locates and produces in a single country (i.e. the outcome is Case A). 
Figure 1.3 sketches the extensive-form game when the countries cannot pre-commit 
with respect to their pollution tax, and the firm moves first. The payoffs appear in the 
order (Profit of Firm; Welfare of Countries 1 and 2). Depending on the values of the 
parameters (determined by "Nature" at the start of the game), the firm will choose 
one- or two-country location. When the firm locates in a single country, it exports 
half of the output to the other country. Two-country location, on the other hand,_ leads 
to no such trade. We have assumed that when 7r: =7r; (respectively, 7r: =7r~) case 
B (respectively, case C) prevails over case A because the firm prefers producing for 
local market (see footnote 16). Two corollaries that emerge from Proposition 4 are as 
follows: 
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Corollary 1: For the same fixed cost, the firm will be more likely to locate in a single 
country when the pollutant is more damaging (i.e. f3 is higher), and vice versa. 
Corollary 2: Trade in the polluting good (i.e. Case A) takes place under three 
scenarios: (i) fixed cost is "large" (i.e. F > ())max); (ii) fixed cost is "moderate" (i.e. 
8max < F:::; ())max) and the pollution damage is not "low" (so that ())(f3) < F ); and 
(Ui) fixed cost is "small" (i.e. F:::; 8ma) and pollution damage is "high" (so that 
8(f3) < F). On the other hand, there is no trade in the polluting good (i.e. Case B or 
C holds) when: (i) fixed cost is "moderate" (i.e. 8max < F :::; ())max) and pollution 
damage is "low" (so that ())(f3) ~ F); or (ii) fixed cost is "small" (i.e. F:::; 8max) and 
pollution damage is not "high" (so that 8(f3) ~ F ). 
Thus, in general, goods with larger fixed cost and/or higher pollution damage 
will tend to get traded. That a firm with larger fixed cost will want to produce in a 
single country, so as to reap more economies of scale, is expected. However, a more 
polluting firm being more likely to produce in a single country is less intuitive. With 
convex pollution damage, one might expect a more polluting firm to divide its 
production between two countries so as to reduce pollution damage and its tax 
burden. But, as f3 increases, both t~ and t~ rises faster than t:, and therefore 
operating profit in Case B and Case C falls faster than that in case A. Hence, single-
country location will be more attractive to a more polluting firm. 
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1.3.3 Firm Location and Global Welfare: Normative Analyses 
Suppose a social planner wants to maximize global social welfare, denoted by GW, 
and defined as the sum ofthe two countries' welfare plus the firm's profit. 18 Since the 
tax is a transfer payment from the firm to the countries, the social planner disregards 
tax revenue while computing global welfare. If the firm produces in a single country, 
global welfare is GW(I) = 2(aq - ~bq2) - 2cq- F - 4/*/. On the other hand, if the 
firm produces in both countries, global welfare IS GW(lI) = 
2( aq - ~ bq2) - 2cq - 2F - 2 f3q2. The social planner maximizes global welfare by 
choosing the level of output. The globally optimal output and welfare levels for one-
country and two-country production, respectively, are 
'(1) _ a 
q -b+4f3 
'(II) = a 
q b+2fJ 
a 2 GW(I) = -F' 
b + 4fJ ' 
2 
GW(II) = a -2F. 
b+2f3 
(1.3.3) 
(1.3.4) 
Comparing equations (1.A3), (1.B3), (1.C7), (1.3.3), and (1.3.4), we see that 
q* (/) > q:, and q* (II) > q~ and q~. Thus, the global optimum output (pollution) 
level is higher than the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium output (pollution) level, 
for one-country or two-country production. In other words, the non-cooperative 
equilibriums lead to underproduction of the polluting good, as unlike the social 
18 Recall that the setting of our model can also be interregional rather than international. In an 
interregional context, the social planner could be a federal government which cares for the welfare of 
both regions 1 and 2 as weil as the profit of the firm, where the firrn belongs to a third region within 
the country . 
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planner, the countries do not take into consideration the foreign firm's profit white 
maximizing their own welfare. Moreover, the social planner will choose one-country 
production if and only if GW(I) > GW(II) , or equivalently, using equations (1.3.3) 
and (1.3.4) 
F 2a2f3 = F~ > - . (h + 2f3)(h + 413) (1.3.5) 
The following result on the social desirability of the firm 's location decision 
follows. 
Proposition 5: 
(i) When the pollution damage parame ter 13 is large, i.e. 13 ~ h, the firm will 
he more likely 10 choose one-country location than the social planner. 
(ii) When the damage parameler is small, i.e. 13 < h, Ihe firm may he more 
(when 13 is not sufficiently small such thal ft < OJ) or less (when 13 is 
sufficiently small such that ft > OJ) likely 10 choose one-country location 
than the social planner. 
Proof: (i) From Proposition 4, when 13 ~ h, the firm chooses one-country location 
whenever F > () . The social planner chooses to locate production in a single country 
iff F> ft. Since ft> () from equations (1.3.1) and (1.3.5), the first part of 
Proposition 5 follows. For instance, for fixed cost in the range ft> F > (), the firm 
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will choose single-country location while the social planner will choose two-country 
location. (ii) When fi < b, the firm chooses single country location iff F < OJ. From 
equations (1.3.2) and (1.3.5) it is seen that ft > OJ when j3 = b, and ft < OJ when 
j3 = O. Since OJ is monotonie in j3, there must exist sorne cutoff value of j3, say 
fi E (O,b) , such that ft = OJ(jj). When j3 is not sufficiently small, i.e. j3 > fi, the 
firm is more likely to choose one country location than the social planner. On the 
other hand, when j3 is sufficiently small, i.e. j3 < fi, the firm is less likely to choose 
one country location than the social planner. 
1.4 First Move by Countries under Pre-Commitment Tax 
In this section we analyze the game when countries can pre-commit to their pollution 
tax rates and the firm takes such commitment credibly. With pre-commitment, the 
countries move first, and engage in tax competition even before the firm makes its 
location decision. As seen in Section 1.3 Case C, tax competition between the 
countries will go on until ail rents are dissipated and the "race to the bottom" tax rate 
t~ emerges. Moving second, the firm will locate and produce 2q~ in any one 
country, and export halfthe output to the other country. The firm will earn a profit of 
• ~ ba2 19 
ne + F, and each country will get welfare of W == 2' Compared to tax 
8(b + j3) 
competition in Case C, where it had to move first, the firm now gains because it has 
to set up plant in a single country only; the countries now lose because the production 
19 The tax rate, output and profit are given by theformulas for t~ (equation l.C6), 2q~ and 7i~ + F , 
and applies for ail values of f3 . 
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and pollution damage is not distributed between two countries. Further comparison of 
the pre-commitment taxation equilibrium in this section with the time-consistent 
taxation equilibrium in section 1.3, gives us the following results. 
Proposition 6: 
(i) When the countries can pre-commit to their tax rates, "race-to-the-
bottom" tax competition always takes place, and moving second, the firm 
locates in a single country. 
(U) Pre-commitment taxation always makes the firm better off than time-
consistent taxation. 
(iii) Pre-commitment taxation, in general, makes the countries worse off than 
lime-consistent taxation. The only exception to this is country 2 in Case A, 
which is better off under pre-commitment taxation. 
Proof: (i) Follows from above discussion. (ii) From equations (l.A3), (l.B3), and 
(l.C7) it is seen that the firm's profit under pre-commitment taxation (7Z"~ + F) 
exceeds its profit under time-consistent taxation (7Z":, or 7Z";, or 7Z"~). (iii) Each 
country's welfare under pre-commitment taxation UV) is generally lower than the 
countries' welfare under time-consistent taxation (~A , or ~B = W2B , or ~c = W2C ). 
The only exception is W > W/; Le. country 2, where production does not take place 
when the firm chooses single-country location (Case A), is worse off under time-
consistent taxation. 
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1.5 First Move by Countries using Lump-sum Subsidy 
This section examines the outcome of the game when the countries cannot pre-
commit to their pollution tax rate, but still can move tirst by using a lump sum 
subsidy. As discussed in the introduction, the countries can move tirst using a lump 
sum subsidy even when they tind it difticult to pre-commitment to their tax rate. In 
this new scenario, we have to add one more stage to the three-stage game in section 
1.3. Now the countries choose a two-part tariff {S,/}: a lump-sum subsidy, S, in the 
tirst stage and a pollution tax, l, in the third stage. The tirm locates in the second 
stage and produces in the last stage of the game. Such sequential setting of Sand t 
occurs because the countries tind it difficult to commit to a pollution tax rate before 
the tirm actually locates in their territory. As will become clear from section 1.6, the 
optimum tax rates chosen by the countries before the tirm locates will not be optimal 
after its location. 
When each country chooses the subsidy amount in the tirst stage, it will do so 
with the objective of attracting the tirm to locate exclusively in its territory, as this 
would give it the maximum possible welfare (W.A ). As the last three stages of the 
present game are the same as the game in section 1.3 (where the tirm moves tirst), we 
have to additionally consider only the tirst stage (subsidy competition between 
countries) of the present game in order to tind its subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. 
In the second stage the tirm can locate either in a single country or in both countries. 
Each possibility is considered separately below. 
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a) Consider first the situation where the firrn, in the second stage, locates in only one 
country (say, country 1). The firrn's profit is 7r:, while country 1 and 2 respectively 
gets welfare levels of ~A and W2A (where ~A > W2A ). According to Proposition 4, 
this happens either when (i) fJ < band F? OJ, or when (ii) fJ? band F > (). As 
country 2 without the plant ends up with a lower welfare than country l, it will be 
willing to offer a subsidy, of an amount say SA' to the firm in order to induce it to 
locate exclusively in country 2. This subsidy amount SA will of course not exceed 
s;ax == ~A _ W2A .20 The firm will accept this offer as this increases its profit from 7r: 
to 7r: + SA' As a result, country 1 s welfare wou Id fall to w/ while country 2 s 
welfare would be at least W2A • Then, country 1 would counteroffer the firm a slightly 
higher subsidy than that offered by country 2 and ask the firrn to locate exclusively in 
country 1. Such subsidy competition between the countries would go on until the 
final subsidy offered equals s;ax . Accepting s;ax, the firm will locate and produce 
2q: output in a one country and export q: output to the other country. The profit of 
the firm will be 7r: + s;ax and the welfare of each country will be W/ . 
b) Consider next the situation where the firm, in the second stage, locates in both 
countries. From Proposition 4, this happens either when (i) fJ? band F ~ e, or 
wh en (ii) fJ < band F < OJ. We take up each case separately: 
20 The value of S;rax = WIA - W2A is smaller when p? b than when p < b . 
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(i) When f3 2 band F ~ B, the firm eams a profit of 1f ~ (with 1f ~ 2 1f:), and the 
countries' welfare levels are W;B = W2
B (with W;A > W;B = W2B > W2A). Country 1, say, 
will be willing to offer a subsidy of SB ( where SB ~ s;ax == w; A - W; B) to the firm in 
order to induce it to locate exclusively in its territory. The firm will accept this offer 
iff JT:+SB >JT~, or equivalently, using equation (1.3.1), F>B-SB' If the firm 
accepts the offer and locates in country 1, country 1 will get at least W;B, and country 
2 will get W2
A
• Country 2 will then counteroffer s;ax == w; A - W2A and the firm will 
locate exclusively in country 2 as 1f: + s;ax > 1f: + s;ax. However, if F ~ B - s;ax 
(whence 1f: + s;ax ~ 1f ~), the firm will reject the initial subsidy offer SB and locate 
and produce in both countries. In other words, when the fixed cost is small enough, 
the firm prefers to forgo the subsidy and incur twice the fixed co st in order to benefit 
from the lower tax (t;) associated with two-country production (rather than accept 
the subsidy, incur the fixed cost once and pay the higher tax t: associated with one-
country production). 
(ii) When f3 < band F < co, the firm eams a profit of 1f ~ (with 1f ~ > 1f:), and the 
countries' welfare levels are W;C = W2
c (with W;A > W;C = W2c > W2A). Country l, say, 
will be willing to offer a subsidy of Sc (where Sc ~ s~ax == W1A - W;c) to the firm in 
order to induce it to locate exclusively in country 1. The firm will accept this offer iff 
JT:+Sc>1f~, or equivalently, using equation (1.3.2), F>co-Sc ' Ifthis happens, 
country 1 will get at least W1C and country 2 will get W/. Country 2 will then 
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counteroffer s;ax == W;A - W2A and the firm will locate exclusively in country 2 as 
• Smax * Smax H 'f F Smax ( h • Smax .) h fi 7l A + A > 7l A + c . owever, 1 ~ OJ - c w ence 7l A + C ~ 7le ,t e Irm 
will reject the initial subsidy offer Sc and locate in both countries. Again, when the 
fixed cost is smalt enough, the firm pre fers to forgo the subsidy and incur twice the 
fixed cost in order to bene fit from the lower tax t~. 
Proposition 7, and Figure 1.4, summarizes the above results. 
Proposition 7: 
(i) When the countries use a second instrument of lump-sum subsidy, they 
compete in the first stage (using the subsidy) even when they cannot pre-
commit to their tax rate. The equilibrium subsidy offered is 
4a2(3b + 4P) /(7b + 8p)2. Accepting this subsidy, the 
firm locates in any one country and that country imposes tax t:. The firm 
then produces 2q: output and exports half this amount to the other country. 
The firm gets a profit of 7l: + s;ax, and each country gets welfare of W2A . 
(ii) The exception to (i) above happens when the fixed cost is very small, i.e. 
when (a) F ~ B-S;ax for p 2. b, or (b) F ~ OJ-s~ax for p < b, where 
ba2(9b+l0PC>/8(b+pc>2(7b+8Pc)' In these Iwo cases subsidy 
competition does not take place in equilibrium. This is because the firm 
rejects the first stage subsidy offèred by the countries, and locates in both 
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countries in order to benefitfrom the lower tax rate (t; or t~, both ofwhich 
are lower than t~). In the former case, if produces q; output in each 
country and earns a profit of 1t;; each country 's welfare is WIB = W2B • In 
the latter case the firm produces q~ output in each country and gets a profit 
of 1t~; each country gets welfare of ~c = W2C • 
In terms of Diagram 1, a lump-sum subsidy essentially has the effect of shifting the 
() and {j} curves downward by the amount of the subsidy (S;ax and s;ax, 
respectively). This is because wh en either country gives a subsidy for exclusive 
location, operating profit in case A increases by the amount of the subsidy.21 Hence, 
for any given fixed cost, a first offer of subsidy by countries increases the likelihood 
of the firm locating in a single country. Moreover, from a normative point of view, 
the firm will be even more (compared to Proposition 5) likely to choose single-
country location than the social planner in the presence of subsidy competition by 
countries (as ft > () - s;ax, and it is more Iikely that ft will exceed {j} - s;ax rather 
than (j}). 
21 Recall that e (respectively, (1)) measures operating profit in case B (respectively, case C) minus 
operating profit in case A. 
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1.6 First Move by Countries using Lump-sum Subsidy and Pre-
Commitment Tax 
Let us now turn to what happens when the countries can pre-commit to their pollution 
tax rates as well as use lump-sum subsidies to attract the firm. Now we have a two-
stage game where each country contemporaneously sets the lump-sum subsidy and 
the tax rate in the first stage, and the firm locates and produces in the second stage. 
When countries can pre-commit to taxes, the section 1.5 choice of {S;ax;I:} will no 
longer be optimal for the countries. This is because any country can make a new offer 
with a slightly lower subsidy amount and tax rate; location by the firm in that country 
will make both the countries as weil as the firm better off. To see this, suppose 
country 2 offers {S;ax;I:}; if the firm accepts this and locates in country 2, it will get 
a profit of 7r: + s~nax and the countries will get welfare of W2A • Now let country 1 
offer a new two-part tariff of {S';I'}, where S' = s;ax - &'(' l' = 1: - &'2' and &'(' &'2 
are positive constants. If the firm accepts this offer and locates in country 1, output, 
profit and country 2 s welfare in this new situation will be: 
, • 462a &'22 7r =7r + +_. 
A 7b+8[1 2b' 
2 
W' WA 6 2a &'2 2 = 2 + +-. 
7b + 8[1 8b 
(1.6.1) 
The net (of subsidy) welfare of country 1 will now be: 
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(1.6.2) 
For this new net welfare of country 1 under {S';t'} to exceed its old net welfare under 
{S;"";t:} , we must have Wt' - S' > W2A or, using equation (1.6.2), 
(1.6.3) 
where l, denotes the lower limit of &" as given by equation (1.6.3). Under {S';t'} , 
country 1 s net welfare will exceed country 2 s welfare iff W;' - S' > W;, or 
equivalently, using equations (1.6.1) and (1.6.2), iff 
(1.6.4) 
Note that l, < 12 , Le. W;' - S' > W; implies W;' - S' > W2A , as W; > W/ from equation 
(1.6.1). Further, the total (inclusive of subsidy) profit of the firm under {S';t'} will 
exceed its total profit under {S;"";t:} iff 
• 4& a 8 2 (1l' + S') - (1l + sm",,) = 2 + _2 - & > 0 
A A 7b + 8[3 2b ' , (1.6.5) 
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(1.6.6) 
By choosing c, and c2 so that l, < c, < 13 , country 1 can ensure that {S'; f'} 
increases both its own welfare as weil as the firm's profit.22 If the chosen c, and c2 
are such that l, < c, < 12 , then country 2 will be better off compared to country 1 (i.e. 
w; > w.' -S'), and will have no incentive to compete. Without the threat of 
competition, country 1 will then increase c" until c, = /2' On the other hand, if the 
chosen c, and C2 are such that /2 < c, , country 2 will receive a lower new welfare 
than country 1 (i.e. W; < W.' - S'). The former will then offer a more attractive two-
part tariff (involving a lower c, and a higher c2 ) to the firm. Competition between 
the countries will ensure that equilibrium c, and &2 are chosen such that the net 
welfare levels of the two countries are equalized (i.e. W: - S' - W' ) and the firm' s , - 2' 
total profit (7f ' + S') gets maximized. Setting c, = /2' whence w.' -S' == W;, and 
substituting this value of c, in equation (1.6.5), we get 
1 S' -_ • Smax 3c2a _ c~ (b 2fJ) 1 S' . . d h • 7f + 7f A + 0 + 2 + . 7f + gets maXlmlze w en c2 = 7b + 8fJ 2b 
(b + 2fJ)(7b + 8fJ) 
.. • • 3b 2a 2 (4b + 5fJ) 
Us mg thlS value of &2' we get c, = 2 2 • (b + 2fJ) (7b + 8fJ) 
22 There exist sorne values of (e),e2) - for instance (e; ,e;) as defined below- such that 1) < 12 < 13 
holds. 
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The above values of E; and E; give the equilibrium two-part tariff, when it is 
simultaneously set, as23 
Remark: It is interesting to note that as > 0 if! 13 < Yz b. 
af3 
(6.7) 
Thus a more harmfully polluting firm will command a higher subsidy as long as the 
pollution damage parameter is small (i.e. 13 < y; b). When 13 > y; b, the subsidy 
amount S decreases as the pollutant becomes more harmful. As weil, t is still 
increasing and concave m 13 and there is no rent capture effect. However, 
• baf3 0 -t - t = > i.e. the tax rate (t) chosen, when the countries 
C (b + f3)(b + 213) , 
compete using both lump-sum subsidy and tax, is greater than that (t~) which is 
chosen when the countries compete using tax only. This is because tax-only 
competition can equivalently be viewed as competition using both the instruments but 
where the subsidy amount is constrained to be zero. 
23 Equivalently, the equilibrium {S;t} can be directly derived as follows: In the tirst stage, the 
countries choose {S;t} such that (i) Yzbq2 + 2tq - 4fJ</ - S = Yzbq2 holds, and (ii) 
1T = 2( a - bq)q - F - 2cq - 2tq + S is maximized. In the second stage the tirm maximizes 1T by 
choosing q. 
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In the second stage the firm locates in a single country, and the equilibrium 
values of output (pollution), total profit and net welfare levels under {S;t } are 
a a 2 1l+S= -F' 2(b + 2fJ) , q = 2(b + 2fJ) ; 
(1.6.8) 
Comparing equations (1.A3), (1.B3), (1.C7) and (1.6.8) we have 
q: < q < q ~ < q~ . As weil, total profit of the firm, -;; + S , exceeds 1l: + s;ax, 1l ~, or 
1l~. The new welfare level of each country, W 1 - S = W 2, is greater than W2A but less 
than ~B or ~c. To summarize: 
Proposition 8: 
(i) When the countries can pre-commit to their tax, they compete in the first 
stage using both lump-sum subsidy and the unit tax. Then the countries 
are generally better off, and the firm is always better off, as compared to 
the situation where the countries cannot pre-commit to their tax and 
compete, in the first stage, using subsidy only. 
(ii) The exception to (i) above occurs when the fixed cost is very small, i.e. 
when (a) F::::; e - s;;ax for fJ ~ b, or (b) F::::; {() - s:;ax for fJ < b. In these 
cases pre-commitment by countries leads to first-stage competition using 
both lump-sum subsidy and tax. This makes the countries worse off as 
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compared to the situation when they cannot pre-commit to their tax and 
subsidy competition does not take place in equilibrium (vide Proposition 7 
ii). 
Thus, pre-commitment tax policy is not always welfare improving for the 
countries (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2). The key difference made by pre-commitment is 
that it instigates tax competition between the countries in the first stage. When tax is 
the only instrument used, first-stage tax competition mostly makes the countries 
worse off. Only the country, which does not get a plant un der time-consistent 
taxation, is better off under pre-commitment taxation (Proposition 6). When lump 
sum subsidy is used as a second instrument, first-stage tax competition makes the 
countries better off in those situations where the countries would have competed, 
using the subsidy, in the first stage anyway. This is because whenever they compete 
for the firm, the countries can only be better off using two instruments rather than 
one. However, if the fixed cost is sufficiently small, first-stage subsidy competition 
between the countries does not take place unless they can pre-commit to their tax rate 
as weil. In such cases, pre-commitment makes the countries worse off (Proposition 
8). 
1. 7 Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the problem of pollution taxation under capital mobility and 
imperfect competition. We show that when countries cannot credibly pre-commit to 
their pollution tax rate, and have to set a time-consistent tax rate, location (like R&D) 
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can be a strategie choice variable available to a polluting firm. Specifically, we model 
the location decision of a polluting monopolist between two competing countries. The 
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium depends not only on the values of parameters like 
marginal cost, fixed cost, and intensity of pollution damage, but also on the ability (or 
lack thereof) of the countries to pre-commit to their pollution tax rate. When tax is the 
only instrument used by the countries towards the firm, and the countries can pre-
commit to their tax rate, "race-to-the-bottom" tax competition between them always 
takes place, and the firm always locates in a single country. However, when the 
countries cannot commit to their tax rate before the firm takes its location decision, 
the firm is able to take its location decision strategically. Instead of locating in a 
single country, the firm may set up a plant in each country - although the latter 
involves a higher fixed cost, it also decreases the tax rate subsequently faced by the 
firm. Proposition 4 shows that if the fixed cost is small enough, the firm will indeed 
follow such a strategy. Consequently, polluting goods with larger fixed costs and/or 
higher pollution damage will tend to be produced in a single country and exported to 
the other (Corollaries 1 and 2). If instead of using pollution tax only, the countries use 
two instruments (lump-sum subsidy and pollution tax) in order to attract the firm, the 
firm could still strategically reject the subsidy and locate in both countries in order to 
benefit from lower taxes. This would happen when the countries are unable to pre-
commit to their tax rate, and the firm's fixed cost is very smalt. 
A second important finding of this paper is that pre-commitment taxation can 
be better or worse for the countries (it is always better for the firm). Ability to 
credibly pre-commit to their pollution tax rate enables the countries to use it to 
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compete with each other in the first stage (before the firm locates). When tax is the 
only instrument used, a pre-commitment tax policy mostly makes the countries worse 
off as compared to time-consistent taxation. Only the country, where no production 
takes place under time-consistent taxation, is better off under pre-commitment 
taxation. When both instruments are used, the pre-commitment tax policy mostly 
makes the countries better off than time-consistent taxation (except wh en the fixed 
cost is very small). A policy implication is that countries may sometimes 
cooperatively choose not to pre-commit to their pollution tax rate even if they could 
do so. Of course, when countries follow time-consistent tax policy, the firm will be 
able to use its location decision strategically. 
From a social welfare standpoint, the polluting good is under-produced in ail 
cases, as the countries do not take into consideration the foreign firm's profit white 
maximizing their individual welfares. As weil, unless the pollution damage parameter 
is sufficiently small, the firm is more likely to choose single-country location than the 
social planner. 
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Figure 1.1: Consumer Surplus (CS), Tax Revenue (TR) and Pollution Damage 
(PD) with single-country production (Case A). 
4b 
Sb 
o 
Equation of: cs = ~(a_t)2" 
2 2b ' 
TR=2 -- t" (a-t) 2b ' 
Equilibrium taxrate is t~ = a(3b+S,8) , with t~ E(,Xa,a) when ,8"Lb, and 
7b+ S,8 
t~ E (0, a) when ,8 < b" 
t 
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Figure 1.2: Consumer Surplus (CS), Tax Revenue (TR) and Pollution Damage 
(PD) with two-country production (Case B). 
8b 
o 
Equation of: cs=k(a-t)2. 
2 2b ' 
TR= -- t· (a-t) 2b ' 
Equilibriurn tax rate is t; = a(b + 2fJB) , with t; E (~a, a). 
3b+ 2fJB 
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t 
Figure 1.3: Firsf move by Firm under ex-post optimal fax 
P?b&F>B 
P<b & F>w 
Locates in one country 
CouDtries 
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Firm 
2q: in one country 
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p?b & F-s.B 
P<b & F-s.w 
Locates in two countries 
CouDtries 
t; 
Firm 
q; in each country 
(71';; W,B =W,B) 
P < b; tax competition 
(. 
Firm 
q; in each country 
(71';; W;' = W,') 
Figure 1.4: First move by Countries using subsidy under ex-post optimal tax 
f3 ? b & F > B - S:~ 
fJ < b & F >01-S;" 
Subsidy competition 
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Locates in one country 
Country 
t: 
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f3 ? b & F ~ B - S:~ 
f3<b & F~01-S;u 
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Locates in two countries 
Country 
f3?b~<b; t; 
Firm Firm 
'/ \: 
(H;; W,B =W,B) (H;;W,C=W,c) 
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Table 1.1: Equilibrium when countries use unit tax only 
Time-consistent tax Pre-commitment 
tax 
Tax rate • • • • tA' or t B ' or te te 
Output (sold in each • • • • qA' or qB' or qe qe 
country) 
Firm's Profit . • • 7r~ +F 7r A , or 7r B , or 7r e 
Countries' Welfare ~ A > W2A, or ~ B = W2B, or W 
~e =W2e 
Notes: 
(i) Jr ~ + F is greater than Jr: and 7r ~ • 
(ii) ~. AB Bee ~ W IS less than ~ ,~ = W2 ,and ~ = W2 ,but W is greater than 
W;. 
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Table 1.2: Equilibrium wh en countries use both nnit tax and lump sum subsidy 
Time-consistent tax Pre-commitment 
tax 
Lump sum subsidy s;ax,orO -S 
Tax rate • • • -tA' or tB, or tc t 
Output (sold in each • • • -qA,or qB,or qc q 
country) 
Firm's Profit * Smax * * - -Jr A + A ,or Jr B' or Jrc Jr+S 
Countries' Welfare W2
A
, or W;B = W2
B
, or 
- - -
W;-S=W2 
W;c = W2
C 
Notes: 
(i) -; + S is greater than Jr: + s;ax, Jr;, and Jr~. 
(ii) W; - S = W2 is greater than W2A, but less than W;B = W: and W;C = W2C . 
(iii) -; + S = Jr~ + F (comparing Tables 1.1 and 1.2). 
(iv) W; - S = W2 is less than W (comparing Tables 1.1 and 1.2). 
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Chapter 2 
The Effect of Liberalization on Corruption when 
Monitoring is Endogenous 1 
2.1 Introduction 
In an increasingly integrating world, the nexus between globalization and corruption 
is an important issue, especially for policy purposes.2 Increasing globalization has not 
only made corruption more "visible", but has also enabled international agencies to 
exert more pressure on corrupt countries to improve their quality of governance. The 
extant literature on corruption has generally found a negative relationship between 
corruption on one hand, and trade, investment and growth on the other (see, for 
examples, Becker and Stigler, 1974; Rose-Ackerman, 1975, 1978; Mauro, 1995; and 
Bardhan, 1997). Corruption, and corrupt administrations, have been regarded as 
inimical to trade and business opportunities.3 In fact licenses, permits, quotas, and 
tariffs are sometimes regarded as policies which public officiais create in order to 
facilitate their rent-seeking activities. Bribes have often been compared to taxes in 
terms of their deleterious effect on commerce. However, as Shleifer and Vishny 
1 This essay is co-authored with Pinaki Bose. 
2 Corruption - the misuse of public office for private gains (Bardhan, 1997) - can be "administrative" 
(misuse by law enforcers) or "grand" (misuse by lawmakers). This paper deals with the former type of 
corruption only. 
3 Leff(1964) has argued that in a second best world, where there are pre-existing policy induced 
distortions, corruption may actually improve welfare. 
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(1993, p. 599) conclude, "the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it 
much more distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation". 
The causality between corruption and openness can run in the reverse 
direction as well: trade Iiberalization and greater competition reduces monopolistic 
rents enjoyed by existing firms which decreases their ability to pay a bribe, thus 
reducing corruption. One exception to this general finding of an inverse relationship 
between corruption and openness is Ades and Di Tella (1999). They showed that, if 
corruptible officiais are paid an efficiency wage to induce honest behaviour, the 
effect of increasing competition on corruption is ambiguous.4 By reducing profits of 
the oligopolistic firms, competition reduces the efficiency wage as it becomes less 
attractive to induce honesty, but at the same time any level of wage deters more 
corruption as the gains to corrupt officiais fall with competition. Thus corruption, 
which is a function of the efficiency wage in Ades and Di Tella's model, could rise or 
fall with competition. 
The empirical evidence on the interrelation between openness and corruption 
has, however, been mixed. Although their theoretical model predicted an ambiguous 
effect of competition on corruption, Ades and Di Tella's (1999) data revealed a 
higher level of corruption in less competitive economies. Wei (2000a) found that a 
rise in the corruption level in a host country reduces inward foreign direct investment. 
In another paper, Wei (2000b) found that "naturally" more open economies tend to 
display a lower level of corruption, where a country's "natural openness" is 
determined by its geography and size. Wei reasoned that since international traders 
4 Efficiency wage is the higher than opportunity wage that must be paid to officiais in order to make 
honest behaviour incentive compatible. See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) for more on efficiency wage. 
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and investors are less tolerant towards corruption than domestic ones, a naturally 
more open economy (such as Singapore) would have a greater incentive to devote 
more resources towards good governance. 
Even though Ades and Di Tella (1999), and Wei (2000) empirically found a 
negative relation between openness and corruption, Knack and Azfar (2003) have 
questioned their finding by pointing out that their implicit exclusion of small, poorly 
governed countries (which are more likely to be more open as well as corrupt) 
constitute a sample selection bias. Moreover, as Knack and Azfar observe, by 
instrumenting for trade intensity with population they (i.e. Ades and Di Tella, and 
Wei) are assuming that country size has no inde pendent impact on corruption levels. 
Controlling for differences in country size, Knack and Azfar found that (p. 2), "the 
relationship between trade intensity and corruption is not robust to the use of newer 
corruption indicators that are less subject to sample selection bias". Similarly, 
Treisman (2000, p. 439) reported a "depressingly small" negative correlation between 
openness to foreign trade and corruption. 
The mixed nature of the empirical evidence seems to suggest that the relation 
between openness and corruption is more complex, and may even be non-monotonic 
due to the interplay of opposing factors that are inherent in globalization. A positive 
relation between openness and corruption is borne out by the initial experience of the 
transitional economies of Eastern Europe and erstwhile USSR, "where essential steps 
to privatize the economy and rewrite the rules of commerce after the demise of 
socialism were often accompanied by widespread corruption" (Transparency 
International, 2005, p. 271). However, there is recent (i.e. 1999-2002) evidence to 
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support the view that "the prevalence and costs of sorne types corruption are 
becoming more moderate in many countries in the region" (ibid). Similarly, Williams 
and Beare (1999, p. 2) have noted that one attribute of a "fairly unitary and cohesive 
discourse on corruption" is "a conviction that corruption has increased to epidemic 
levels, and that globalization has provided much of the impetus and opportunity for 
this growth." 
The purpose of the present paper is to uncover a new channel through which 
openness can affect corruption, and to show that their consequent relationship may 
not be monotonie in nature. Greater openness can exert two types of pressures on a 
corrupt country. For one, greater openness makes domestic corruption more 
internationally "visible".5 Secondly, international bodies have a greater incentive and 
ability to pressurize more open countries to crack down on corruption. For example, 
according to Williams and Beare (1999, p. 142), "both the IMF and World Bank have 
recently introduced reforms to their lending practices making the provision of funds 
conditional upon the successful implementation of a variety of macroeconomic and 
anti-corruption reforms." Similar anti-corruption initiatives have been undertaken by 
the Organization of American States (Inter-American Convention against Corruption, 
1996), OECD (Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officiais in 
International Business Transactions, 1997), and the African Union (Convention on 
Preventing and Combating Corruption, 2003). The OECD convention, for instance, 
5 See, for examples, the following media articles: "Nigeria Urged to Battle Corruption" (The New York 
Times, August 7, 2005), "The 08 s African Challenge" (The Economist, July 7, 2005), and "Africa 
Tackles Oraft, With Billions in Aid in Play" (The New York Times, July 6, 2005). 
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seeks to criminalize bribe payments by OECD-country corporations to foreign 
government officials.6 
Different studies have used different measures of "openness" like share of 
trade in GDP, inflow and outflow of foreign capital, and the degree of convergence of 
domestic and foreign priees. In contrast, openness in our paper is measured by the 
number of goods and services available for consumption within the economy. This is 
in the spirit of international trade models with product differentiation (such as 
Krugman, 1979, 1980; and Lawrence and Spiller, 1983), where trade liberalization 
leads to an increase in the number of goods available for consumption in the 
liberalizing country. 
We consider a hierarchical public administrative structure consisting of many 
corruptible inspectors, and an honest regulator (an anti-corruption agency). The 
inspectors operate at a lower level, dishonestly enforcing sorne regulation on firms, 
white the higher-level regulator undertakes deterrence activities to reduce corruption 
among the inspectors. The inspectors are like agents who act on behalf of the 
principal (the regulator), but maximize their self-interest. We find that an increase in 
the number of consumption goods increases the marginal utility of accepting a bribe, 
which, in the absence of deterrence activities, leads to greater corruption among the 
inspectors (section 2.2). In the presence of monitoring by a regulator, however, 
corruption may not increase monotonically, especially if greater openness also leads 
6 The US, through its Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1977, was the first country to criminalize bribe 
payments by domestic corporations to foreign governments. Nevertheless, Transparency 
International's 1999 Bribe Payers Index ranked the US 9th among 191eading exporting countries 
whose corporations were more likely (in increasing order ofrank) to paya bribe. Wei (2000a) also 
found that US investors are no more averse to corruption in host countries than OECD investors on 
average. 
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to greater pressure on the regulator to tackle corruption. This is shown in section 2.3 
of our paper, where we introduce the regulator. The regulator optimally chooses her 
monitoring frequency by minimizing a weighted sum of the various social costs, and 
puts an increasing weight on the extent of corruption (one of the social costs) as 
liberalization progresses. Our paper demonstrates that while greater openness initially 
leads to increased bureaucratie corruption, the accompanying increases in 
"corruption-reducing" activities can cause corruption to fall after some "threshold" of 
liberalization has been reached. Thus, our analysis supports the existence of a 
"Kuznet's-type curve" in the relationship between corruption and economic 
liberalization. The role of pre-commitment by the regulator, to her monitoring 
activity, is also analyzed in section 2.3. By credibly pre-committing to a monitoring 
frequency, the regulator is not only able to detect violators (which she is able to do 
even if she cannot credibly pre-commit) but also able to influence the optimizing 
behaviour of the corruptible inspectors. Hence, we find corruption to be less under 
pre-commitment. Section 2.4 concludes. 
2.2 Corruption Without Deterrence 
Consider a closed economy where many identical consumers derive utility by 
consuming n goods (or n varieties of a differentiated good). Following Spence 
(1976) and Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), we assume that consumers have an innate 
preference for variety, and that each individual's utility is given by the CES utility 
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[ ]
I/P 
function U = tx; , where Xi is the representative individual's consumption of 
good i E [1,n], and P E (0,1) is a constant. 
Suppose the government imposes a regulation on F firms in this economy.7 
Let c denote a firm's cost of implementing this regulation. For example, the 
regulation could be one that requires each of the F firms to install a new, more 
environmentally friendly, technology, which costs c. Further suppose there are M 
(with M ~ F) government inspectors to enforce the regulation. For analytical 
convenience, we assume that one inspector inspects and certifies only one tirm.8 The 
inspectors are corruptible, and the firms are willing to offer a bribe of an amount B to 
the inspectors for false certification. The maximum amount of bribe a firm will be 
willing to pay is c, the cost it can save by such bribing.9 The inspectors will accept 
the bribe if utility from it exceeds their disutility (psychic cost or guilt) from being 
corrupt. The net utility of a corrupt inspector is then 
[ 
n ]I/P 
U-8= LX; -8, (2.1) 
1=1 
7 These F dornestic firrns rnay produce sorne or none (iftheir output is exported) of the n goods that 
are consumed in the economy. 
8 As in Ades and Di Tella (1999), and Acemoglu and Verdier (2000). 
9 The setting of our model is similar to what Sapru (1998, p. 172) notes for India, "The practice of 
large scale corruption and other forms ofbribery among officiais has stalled the implementation of 
pollution controllaws to a significant extent. Industry owners commonly perceive that public servants 
can be bought by monetary incentives. Therefore, industrial polluters reason that they have recourse to 
cheaper ways than to comply with regulations that may entait significant cost." 
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where e is the psychic cost associated with being corrupt. The inspectors are 
heterogeneous in this cost, and e is distributed uniformly over the interval [0, 1f]. 
For an inspector who does not take a bribe, (J = O. 
To simplify computation, we assume that the inspectors earn zero salary 
income (so that their only income cornes from accepting the bribe), and that the 
priees of ail goods are equal to p, normalized to 1. Then the indirect utility of a 
corrupt inspector will be 
V(n, B, (J) = nY B - (J, (2.2) 
where r == (1- p) / p > 0 . Since by not accepting the bribe an inspector will earn zero 
utility, the inspector who is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the bribe will 
have a threshold psychic cost of 
(J* = nY B. (2.3) 
Let M(B) = Mf)' /8 = nY BM /8 denote the number of corrupt inspectors when the 
bribe amount is B. Keeping in mind that the bribe cannot exceed the cost of the green 
technology, c, we define the maximum number of corrupt inspectors as 
(2.4) 
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With one inspector per firm, let the equilibrium number of bribe-paying firms 
(also the number ofcorrupt officiais) be denoted by M*. Then, it is easy to see that: 
(i) If Mmax < F, then B* = c, and M* = M max' This is an interior equilibrium where 
only sorne of the F firms pay the maximal bribe to an equal number of inspectors. e* 
is strictly less than {j, i.e. officiais with higher psychic cost of corruption remain 
honest. 
~ * Fe ~* (ii) If F :5. M max' then B = -- :5. c and M = F. In equilibrium the bribe amount 
nYM 
is less than (or equal to) c, and ail firms pay the bribe. If there are more inspectors 
than firms, not ail inspectors will be corrupt. 
An increase in the number of goods increases the utility from corruption, 
which induces inspectors with higher psychic costs to accept bribes. Thus, M* 
initially increases with n till the number of corrupt inspectors equals F, the total 
number of firms. At this point, M (c) = F , using which we derive the corresponding 
number of goods to be at the threshold value of ni =. (Fel CM)IIY. If the number of 
available goods is less than ni' we get case (i). Otherwise, case (ii) holds. 
Proposition 1: If, due to opening up of trade, the number of goods available for 
consumption in the economy (n) increases, this initially increases the number of 
corrupt inspectors M*, keeping the bribe amount unchanged at c (case (i»). When 
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n = nI' ail firms become corrupt, and any further increase in n reduces the amount of 
the bribe, keeping the number of corrupt inspectors unchanged at F (case (ii». 
Proof: Follows from the above discussion. 
2.3 Monitoring and Bribery 
We now introduce a government anti-corruption agency (the "regulator") that 
monitors firms to apprehend violators, and assume that the regulator is not corrupt. 
The regulator randomly monitors a fraction m E [0,1] of the total number of firms. If 
a firm is caught violating the regulation, it has paya penalty of an amount PF, as weil 
as implement the regulation; the corresponding inspector has to paya penalty of PM. 
The penalty amounts are decided exogenously (perhaps by the judiciary), and are 
outside the regulator's control.\O When there is monitoring, the maximum bribe that a 
firm will be willing to pay is 
B = c - m( c + PF ) • (2.5) 
In this section, we assume that there are as many inspectors as firms (i.e. 
M = F), and confine our analysis to the interior equilibrium where only sorne 
inspectors/firms are corrupt and the maximum bribe is paid. The expected bribe 
income of a corrupt inspector, under monitoring, becomes B - mPM • A corrupt 
10 Higher penalties would reduce the regulator's need for monitoring. However, social conventions 
(such as "penalty should be commensurate with crime") inhibit the setting of extreme penalties in our 
paper. 
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inspector' s indirect utility is then V (n, B, 0) = nY (B - mP M ) - O. The inspector, who 
is indifferent to accepting a bribe, will have a psychic cost of 
(2.6) 
where we have substituted the value of B using (2.5). This gives the number of bribe-
accepting inspectors (also bribe-paying firms) as 
~ MO" M 
M = -=- = -=-nY {c -m(c + P)}, 
o 0 
(2.7) 
where P == PF + PM" Note that M, as given by (2.7), represents total corruption. 
Since now there is a regulator carrying out deterrence activities, this total corruption 
can be decomposed into (i) detected (by the regulator) corruption, mM, and (ii) 
unchecked corruption, (1- m)M. 
The regulator chooses her monitoring frequency (m) optimally, so as to 
minimize a weighted sum of three social costs: (i) the cost of, or damage from, 
unchecked corruption, /JJ (1- m)M, (ii) the firms' cost of complying with the 
regulation, c{M - (1- m)M} , and (iii) the cost of monitoring, ~ 8(mM)2.II Thus, 
denoting the weights on the first two costs as wJ and w2 respectively, we assume that 
the regulator minimizes expected social cost Z, where 
Il Similar assumptions about the regulating agency's objective function are made by Grieson and 
Singh (1990), and Bose (1995). 
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(2.8) 
In the first term on the right-hand-side (R.H.S.) of (2.8), parameter /31 denotes the 
marginal damage from unchecked corruption. 12 If, as in our example, there is a one-
to-one correspondence between unchecked corruption and total pollution (i.e. if each 
corrupt firm, which escapes detection and does not install the green technology, 
generates one unit of pollution), then we can also interpret /31 as the marginal 
pollution damage. 13 Since greater openness leads to greater international pressure on 
a government to control corruption (or pollution), we expect the regulator to put more 
weight on unchecked corruption damage as liberalization progresses (i.e. as n 
increases). To capture this idea, we assume that 
W1 =an/N, (2.9) 
where a > 0 is a constant, and N denotes the total number of goods produced 
worldwide, Le. nE (no,N] .14 To reduce notation, we define /3 == a/3l. In the second 
term on the R.H.S. of (2.8), M - (1- m)M is the total number of compliant firms, 
which comply with the regulation (Le. install the green technology) at a cost of c per 
12 Note that the regulator cares about unchecked corruption rather than total corruption, as her 
(international) reputation depends on the former and not the latter. 
13 If pollution damage was quadratic in total pollution, our computations would become more 
complicated but our results would not change qualitatively. 
14 The lower limit for n is defined in equation (2.11). 
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firm. The third term on the R.H.S. of(2.8) represents the regulator's quadratic cost of 
monitoring the mM firms, with <5 being the slope of the marginal monitoring cost. 
In what follows we consider two versions of the monitoring game. In the first 
version, analyzed in section 2.3.1, we assume that the regulator is able to credibly 
pre-commit to her monitoring frequency, m. Section 2.3.2 deals with the second 
version of the monitoring game, where such pre-commitment is not possible. As 
discussed in Chapter l, pre-commitment is an issue because an ex-ante optimal 
monitoring frequency, chosen by the regulator before the inspectors decide whether 
to be corrupt or not, will not be ex-post optimal for her to implement, once the 
inspectors have made their decision. Hence, unless the regulator possesses specifie 
commitment mechanisms for adhering to announced policies even after they become 
sub-optimal, her ex-ante monitoring policy williack credibility with the inspectors. 15 
In section 2.3.3, we explain the role of pre-commitment further, and discuss the 
results obtained in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. 
2.3.1 Monitoring with Pre-Commitment 
When the regulator can pre-commit to her monitoring frequency, we have a 
sequential game consisting of the following stages. First, the regulator chooses her 
monitoring frequency, m, so as to minimize Z. Second, the inspectors decide whether 
to accept bribes from the firms. Non-bribing firms implement the regulation (Le. 
install the green technology). In the third stage, the regulator randomly monitors the 
IS This issue oftime eonsisteney of govemment poliey was first highlighted by Kydland and Preseott 
(1977), and has been extensively dealt with sinee then. 
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firms, and apprehends violators. Firms caught violating the regulation have to pay the 
penalty PF (the corresponding inspectors have to pay PM)' as weil as implement the 
regulation. 16 
To derive the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium of this sequential game, we 
solve it backwards. The solution of the last two stages is given by (2.5), (2.6) and 
(2.7). While optimally choosing her monitoring frequency in the first stage, the 
regulator takes into consideration the reaction of the inspectors/firms to any given m, 
as specified by (2.7). Substituting (2.7) and (2.9) into (2.8), and minimizing Z with 
respect to m, we get the optimal monitoring frequency, from the tirst order condition 
(FOC), as 
• m (2.10) 
2nY (c + P)(itv fJ - w2c) + ôBM 
To ensure an interior equilibrium, where the regulator chooses a positive 
monitoring frequency, we assume the following lower limit for n: 17 
(2.11) 
16 In terms of our example, pollution generation, due to production by the non-green firms (Le. the 
undetected violators), takes place in a final stage. 
17 Recall that {3;: a{31 . If n ~ w2cN / {3 , weighted marginal corruption damage (iN {3) will be less 
than, or equal to, weighted marginal compliance cost (w2c) , and the regulator will choose not to 
monitor at ail (i.e. m' = 0 ). Also note that marginal corruption damage ({31) should be greater than 
marginal compliance cost (c), in order to justify the regulation. 
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Then, from (2.10), we have m' < 1 as n Y P(r,. fJ - w2c) + ô1iM > O. The second order 
condition (SOC) for minimizing Z is satisfied as 
(2.12) 
Substituting m' from (2.10) into (2.6), we get equilibrium 0** as 
0" = nY{cÔeM -nYP(c + P)('}I,.f3-w2c)} 
eqm 2nY (c + P)('}I,. f3 - w2c) + ôOM . 
(2.13) 
The effect of liberalization on total (respectively, unchecked) corruption 
depends on the sign of the derivative of O:;m (respectively, (1- m *W:;m) with respect 
to n. These derivatives, however, are complicated expressions in terms of the 
parameters, and cannot be unambiguously signed. Hence, we take recourse to a 
numerical example, and assume the following parameter values: 
0=1, N=lOO, M=10, y=l, c=O.l, ô=O.OI, P=0.02, f3=0.2, 
We show that, for the se parameter values, the effect of Iiberalization on corruption is 
non-monotonie. 
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Substituting the parameter values into (2.10), (2.11) and (2.13), we have m' = 
0.22n(O.2n -1) 
0.24n(0.2n -1) + 10' no = 5, and 
e" = n{l- 0.0024n(O.2n -1)} . Thus, 
eqm 0.24n(O.2n -1) + 10 
0< O:;m < e for n < 48.2. It can be shown that aO:;m / an (respectively, 
a{ (1- m' )Oe:m} / an ) is greater than, equal to, or less than zero according as n is less 
than, equal to, or greater than 12.9 (respectively, 9.2). Thus, the impact of 
liberalization on both total, and unchecked, corruption is described by an inverted-U 
shaped curve. This leads to the following result: 
Proposition 2: When the regulator is able to credibly pre-commit to her monitoring 
frequency, an increase in economic openness can initially lead to an increase in the 
level of total (respective/y, unchecked) corruption. However, once openness reaches 
a threshold value (given by n = 12.9 (respectively n = 9.2)), any further increase in 
openness can lead to a decrease in the level of total (respectively, unchecked) 
corruption. A set of sufficient conditions for the existence of such an inverted-U 
shaped curve is given by our numerical example. 
2.3.2 Monitoring without Pre-Commitment 
When the regulator cannot credibly pre-commit to her monitoring frequency, we have 
a simultaneous move game, whence the regulator cannot incorporate the 
inspectors' /firms' reaction function while minimizing social cost Z. Instead, the 
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regulator minimizes (2.8) with respect to m, taking total corruption (M) as given. 
The FOC gives the regulator's best response as a function of total corruption: 
(2.14) 
Again, assumption (2.11) implies that m" is positive. From (2.14), we see that 
monitoring by the regulator is increasing in the level of total COITuption.18 The SOC 
for minimizing Z is satisfied as 8M2 > o. Solving (2.7) and (2.14) simultaneously, 
we get the equilibrium total corruption as 
_ nY&M2 
M eqm = nY (c+P)("Irvf3- w2c)+8BM· (2.15) 
Differentiating (2.15) with respect to n, we get 
8Meqm nY- 1c8M2 {y8BM -nY+1f3(c+P)/ N} 
--;;;- = {8BM + nY (c + P)("Irv f3 - W 2C)}2 
(2.16) 
18 Papers on optimal deterrence, such as Grieson and Singh (1990) and Bose (1995), show this to be 
the optimal response of regulators in simultaneous move games between potential violators and a 
regulatory authority. 
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Thus, aMeqm / an is greater than, equal to, or less than, zero according as n is 
1 
( 
y8BMN )r+1 less than, equal to, or greater than == n2 • Thus we have the following P(c +P) 
result: 
Proposition 3: When the regulator cannot credibly pre-commit to her monitoring 
frequency, an increase in economic openness initially leads to an increase in the level 
of total corruption. However, once openness reaches a threshold value (n2 , as 
defined above), any further increase in openness leads to a decrease in the level of 
total corruption. 
Substituting the previously assumed parameter values into (2.11), (2.14) and (2.15), 
5 •• 0.1n(0.2n-l) d M- IOn Th we get no = , m = , an e m = . us, 
0.12n(0.2n-l)+10 q 12n(0.2n-l)+10 
0< M eqm < M for n < 12 or n > 34.6. Once again, it can be shown that aMeqm / an 
(respectively, a{ (1- m· )Meqm } / an) is greater than, equal to, or less than zero 
according as n is less than, equal to, or greater than 20.4 (respectively, 13.5). This 
gives a non-monotonie relation between liberalization, and both total and unchecked 
corruption, as laid out by the following result: 
Proposition 4: Suppose the regulator cannot credibly pre-commit to her monitoring 
frequency, and parame ter values are as given in our numerical example. Then, an 
increase in economic openness within 5 < n < 12 leads to an increase in the levelof 
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total, and unchecked, corruption. However, any increase in openness beyond 
n > 34.6 leads to a decrease in the level of total, and unchecked, corruption. 
Recall that in this section 2.3, because we have assumed there are as many 
inspectors as firms, the firms will pay the maximum bribe amount. Using (2.14) and 
(2.15) in (2.5), the equilibrium bribe is derived as 
B O' = c nY PM(r'N f3 - w2c) + oOM 
nY (c + PF + PM )(r'N f3 - w2c) + oOM 
(2.17) 
Remark: It is interesting to note that white a stiffer penalty on corrupt firms (i.e. 
higher PF ) reduces both equilibrium corruption CMeqm ) and bribe amount (Boo), a 
stifJer penalty on corrupt inspectors (i.e. higher PM) reduces corruption but raises 
the amount of the bribe, in equilibrium. 19 
Proof: P == PF + PM' From (2.15) and (2.17), we have 8Meqm /8PF < 0, 
2.3.3 Discussion 
When the regulator chooses her optimal monitoring frequency, she does this so that 
the marginal benefit of monitoring (in terms of reduced corruption damage) is equal 
19 This is consistent with Mookherjee and Png (1995), who found that marginal increases in penalty 
imposed on the bribe-taker might raise the bribe being paid in equilibrium. 
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to the marginal cost (in terms of firms' compliance cost, and the regulator's 
monitoring cost). From (2.10) and (2.14), we see that the regulator chooses a positive 
monitoring frequency, unless weighted marginal corruption damage (iNP) is less 
than, or equal to, weighted marginal compliance cost (w2c) , in which case the 
regulator would choose not to monitor at ail (i.e. m' = 0 or m" = 0). Then, total and 
unchecked corruptions would both equal M max' as in section 2.2. However, we 
exclude this no-monitoring corner solution by assuming that n > w2cN / fJ . 
When the regulator is unable to pre-commit, she takes total corruption, or 
regulation-violation, as given. To her, the efficacy of monitoring then only lies in 
increasing the number of detected violators, and decreasing the number of unchecked 
violators (holding total corruption constant). On the other hand, monitoring un der 
pre-commitment allows the regulator to reduce unchecked corruption both by 
reducing total corruption (by influencing the inspectors' decision to be corrupt), as 
weil as by increasing detected corruption. Because of its higher marginal benefit, the 
regulator monitors more firms under pre-commitment. Comparing (2.10) with (2.14), 
using (2.15) and (2.11), we have 
••• nY(c+P)(iNfJ-w2c) YP(iNfJ-w2c)+lifM m - m = -r--------'---'--"-"'-'----=--'--'I-1,----"-'-'-'---=--"'-----<----=---r > 0 
y (c + P)(iN fJ - w2c) + lifM nY (c + P)(iN fJ - w2c) + 8BM 
(2.18) 
Since, from (2.7) we know that higher monitoring leads to lower total corruption, we 
have the following result: 
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Proposition 5: Both total and unchecked corruption are lower, when the regulator is 
able to credibly pre-commit to her monitoring frequency, than their corresponding 
values, when the regulator is unable to do so. 
Proof: Follows from (2.7), (2.18), and the definition of unchecked corruption, 
(l-m)M. 
In general, in the presence of monitoring by a regulating (anti-corruption) 
agency, an increase in economic openness has two opposing effects on the corruptible 
inspectors. There is a "benefit effect" to the inspectors, as bribery becomes a more 
"desirable" option in the face of greater variety in consumption. As more 
consumption goods become available, the marginal utility of a bribe increases, which 
induces more inspectors to become corrupt. On the other hand, greater openness also 
results in greater international pressures on the government to crack down on 
corruption (or pollution). This raises deterrence activity by the regulator, and the cost 
of expected penalty to inspectors and firms. This "co st effect" leads to less 
corruption. When the level of openness is low, the "benefit effect" exceeds the "cost 
effect", and corruption rises with increasing openness. However, when the level of 
openness exceeds a threshold, the "cost effect" dominates the "benefit effect", and 
corruption decreases with openness. The result in a "Kuznet's-type curve" in 
corruption. 
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2.4 Conclusion 
We have shown that an "inverted-U" or a "Kutznet's-type curve" can describe the 
incidence of bureaucratie corruption that accompanies increased levels of openness 
and globalization. This result was derived analytically for total corruption when the 
regulator is unable to pre-commit (Proposition 3), and numerically for the other cases 
(Propositions 2 and 4). Moreover, the regulator's ability to credibly pre-commit to 
deterrence activities is shown to have a detrimental effect on corruption (Proposition 
5). It should be pointed out that if liberalization increased (decreased) profitability in 
sorne sectors of the economy, it would increase (decrease) the willingness offirms in 
those sectors to pay a bribe, and thus increase (decrease) corruption only among 
public officiais enforcing regulations in those sectors. We, however, did not model 
this obvious link between liberalization and corruption. In our model, the positive 
effect of liberalization on corruption cornes through another, less obvious, channel: 
the higher willingness of ail officiais, enforcing regulations in ail sectors of the 
economy, to accept a bribe (Proposition 1). Thus, our model suggests that the impact 
of liberalization on corruption will be sectorally more widespread than what is 
suggested by the obvious channel. 
Since the efficacy of public policies depends on the level of corruption, our 
result has implications for many studies that investigate the consequences of 
globalization on environmental regulation. Damania, et al. (2003), for example, find 
that the effect of trade liberalization on environmental policy depends on the level of 
corruption, and that higher corruption leads to a more lenient environmental policy. 
Lopez and Mitra (2000) show that, in the presence of corruption, pollution levels are 
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higher, and the turning point of the "Environmental Kuznet's Curve" is achieved at a 
higher level of income and pollution compared to their socially optimal levels. 
However, both these papers take corruption as exogenous, and do not model the 
effect of trade liberalization or growth on the level of corruption itself. Corruption in 
their models is the weight of bribe relative to social welfare in the government's 
(lawmaker's) objective function. Thus, Damania, et al. and Lopez and Mitra deal 
with "grand" corruption, and the formulation of environmental policies/laws, which 
deviate from socially optimal level in the presence of corruption. In contrast, our 
paper deals with "administrative" corruption, and the problems with implementing 
existing policies/laws in the presence of corruption. Of course, in practice, the 
efficacy of an environmental regulation will de pend not only on its proper 
formulation but honest implementation as weil. Any analysis of the final impact of 
liberalization on actual pollution, in the presence of corruption, would thus have to 
incorporate both these issues. 
As discussed in the introduction, there is, at the very least, a number of 
journalistic reports and anecdotal evidence which indicate that a relationship between 
liberalization and administrative corruption may be manifest in many of the 
transitional and developing economies, and that this relationship may be non-
monotonie in nature. The present paper provides a theoretical underpinning for this, 
albeit in a partial equilibrium setting. 
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Chapter 3 
Efficient Labeling Policies for Credence Goods: 
Who Should Pay? 1 
3.1 Introduction 
In recent years, there has been a growing public focus, and consumer and policy level 
concerns, regarding goods whose production processes may have environmental 
consequences, or may involve practices that seem to violate notions of "fair trade" or 
human rights. One manifestation of consumer consciousness about the environment is the 
increasing willingness to paya premium for "greener" products that are less harmful to 
the environment (Forsyth et al., 1999; Amacher, et al., 2004; Bjorner, et al., 2004). For 
example, using 1997-2001 data for Denmark, Bjorner et al. (2004) found that Danish 
consumers were willing to pay a 13-18% price premium on different brands of toilet 
paper carrying the Nordic Swan eco-label. Similar social concerns may also be reflected 
by public policies (spurred on by public pressure, lobbying, etc.) that restrict domestic 
production or imports of items from firms or countries that violate certain standards of 
environment or fair trade. For example, there may be a ban against import of goods that 
utilize child labour or violate emissions standards. 
1 This essay is co-authored with Pinaki Bose. 
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This willingness of consumers to pay more for environment-friendly goods 
amounts to their voluntarily contributing to a public good, and has been called "impure 
altruism" by Andreoni (1990). However, oftentimes consumers cannot ascertain the 
environmental quality of a product even after observing or consuming it. This mostly 
happens when the environmental quality of the product is related to its production 
process, and is not an observable attribute of the product. Such products are called 
credence goods (as different from search goods and experience goodi), an example 
being "dolphin-safe" tuna. Genetically modified (GM) food is another example of 
credence good. Due to the unsettled state of the science of GM organisms, many 
consumers have concerns about the long-term ecological and health impacts of GM 
crops.3 They are therefore willing to pay less for the GM variety of a crop compared to its 
non-GM variety. However, whether a product is genetically modified or not is an 
unobservable attribute of the product to consumers. Besides those related to environment 
and health, there may be other hidden attributes of a product that consumers can care 
about. For example, sorne consumers may be willing to paya premium for goods that are 
produced using fairer labour standards. While the present paper focuses on 
environmental aspects, it will be evident that our analysis can be applied to the 
information revelation issues involving aIl credence goods in general. 
When environmental friendIiness of a product is private information to the 
producers, even non-green producers will have an incentive to pretend to be green in 
order to profit from the consumers' higher willingness to pay. Therefore, in the absence 
2 By definition, consumers observe the quality of search goods before purchase, and experience the quality 
of experience goods after consumption. 
3 Scepticism about GM food is more widespread in the EU as compared to North America (Economist, 19 
May 2004). 
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of credible information disclosure mechanisms, consumers will find it difficult to believe 
firms' claims about the greenness oftheir products, and firms will in turn find it difficult 
to sell greener products that are costlier to produce. One possible way to break this 
deadlock is the use of eco-labels by firms. Such strategies to increase information on the 
environmental friendliness of products have become so popular that they have been 
ca lied the "third wave" in environmental pOlicy.4 
Ever since Germany set up its Blue Angel programme in 1977, many developed 
and developing countries have established eco-Iabelling schemes.5 As weil, the 
International Standards Organisation (ISO) has set up its ISO 14000 series, which 
certifies good environmental practices by producers. The growing popularity of eco-
labels, and sorne evidence of their success,6 has recently led economists to formally 
analyse them. The default analytical approach has been to treat eco-labels as another 
means of vertical product differentiation available to firms. Quality competition (using 
eco-labels) among firms is mode lied as another stage preceding priee or output 
competition in a multi-stage game.7 Amacher, et al. (2004) model eco-Iabelling as an 
investment in a three-stage game with quality and price competition. Investment in green 
technologies reduces the fixed cost of providing quality, which is an observable product 
attribute in their mode!. Sedjo and Swallow (2002) find that consumers' higher 
willingness to pay is not sufficient for a price premium to exist for certified goods. In 
another study, they show that, in a general equilibrium setting, eco-Iabelling ofwood may 
4 Legal remedies such as liability laws and emission standards being the "first wave", and market-based 
instruments such as pollution taxes and emission trading, being the "second wave" (Tietenberg , 1998). 
5 For an evaluation ofsome ofthese programmes see OECD (1997), and US EPA (1998). A briefaccount 
of the Blue Angel programme can be found in US EPA (1998, p. 847-853). 
6 For example in the US, tuna without "dolphin-safe" certification has disappeared from the market. 
7 Shaked and Sutton (1982) showed that such quality competition could be used to relax price competition. 
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lead to conversion of forest land to other ecologically less desirable uses (Swallow and 
Sedjo, 2000). Other studies examine various issues like "voluntary overcompliance", 
where sorne firms voluntarily exceed legal environmental standards (Arora and 
Gangopadhyay, 1995; Kirchhoff, 2000), and eco-labels as trade barri ers (Greaker, 2006; 
Tian, 2003). 
Our paper focuses on the design of optimal regulatory policy and its enforcement. 
In a binary case, where there are only two possible types of producers of a good, "green" 
and "brown", labelling by any one type is sufficient to solve the information asymmetry 
problem.8 The questions we address are, in such binary cases, (i) which type of producers 
should label their product, and (ii) what method of labelling should be followed. While it 
is true that if labelling was perfect and voluntary only green firms would seek eco-labels, 
the government could legally impose mandatory labelling requirement on the brown 
firms ifthis turned out to be welfare enhancing.9 
Two methods of labelling are considered in this paper - "self-Iabelling" and "third 
party labelling". These respectively correspond to the ISO 14021 (or "Type II'') and ISO 
14024 (or "Type 1") types of environmental-product cIaims. JO In self-Iabelling, firms 
make cIaims about sorne hidden attribute oftheir product that consumers care about (such 
as "made from x% recycled material", "organic", etc.). Although su ch cheap talk is 
8 Thus, we are ignoring situations where the greenness of the product is a continuous variable. Heyes and 
Maxwell (2003) and Tian (2003), for example, model environment friendliness as a continuous variable. 
9 Examples of such mandatory 'negative' labelling include the state of California's Proposition 65 (which 
requires manufacturers to warn the public about the hazards or adverse health impacts associated with their 
product), and the statutory warning that appears on cigarettes. Moreover, sorne consumer groups have 
suggested that producers of genetically modified food should be legally required to label their products as 
such. 
10 A third type (ISO 14025) of environmental claim requires the manufacturer to present quantified product 
information that consumers can use in making purchase decisions. The information is presented in a form 
that facilitates comparison among similar products. An example is the US FDA's nutrition label. However, 
sometimes such detailed technical information may be difficult for consumers to interpret. Because the 
logos (e.g. Nordic Swan) they carry, or claims they make (e.g. "x% recycled" or "biodegradable"), 
summarise the relevant information, Type 1 and Type Il labels are easier for consumers to follow. 
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generally costless, there is an adverse selection problem associated with it. In fact, to 
prevent misleading advertising by firms, organisations like the US Federal Trade 
Commission, and the EU have issued guidelines for making environmental claims. In 
third party labelling, on the other hand, firms obtain permission, in return for a payment, 
to use the logo or seal ofapproval issued bya labelling agency (e.g. EU's Eco-Label and 
Canada's EcoLogo). The labelling agency is often a governmental or quasi-governmental 
organisation. 1 1 Such costly signais are, in general, more credible to consumers. 
Our results show that the optimal labelling policy depends on the production, 
labelling, and monitoring costs involved. If ail firms act honestly, no monitoring would 
be required, and the optimal third party labelling policy would depend on the production 
and labelling costs alone. Specifically, third party labelling requirement should be 
imposed on brown firms if and only if the market share of the brown good is less than a 
threshold value that depends on labelling costs. Of course, honest self-Iabelling would 
costlessly solve the information asymmetry problem, and trivially lead to the first-best 
outcome. However, since the brown firms have an incentive to pass off as green, both 
self-labelling and third party labelling policies are open to misuse. This paper, therefore, 
also investigates optimal labelling rules when firms can cheat with respect to their labels, 
and the government has to randomly monitor the green firms in order to deter brown 
firms from cheating. Under self-Iabelling, a brown firm can cheat by simply making false 
claims. On the other hand, under third party labelling, brown firms will be able to cheat 
by either evading labelling rules, or by using fake labels.12 When there is cheating, in 
II See US EPA (1998), P 21. 
12 These issues are further explored in section 4. In this paper we assume that it is only the firms, and not 
the labelling agency, which can be dishonest. If the labelling agency was also corruptible, it could take a 
82 
addition to labelling costs, monitoring costs need to be considered while designing 
optimal labelling rules. The optimal third party labelling policy then depends on a new 
threshold market share, which could be higher or lower than the corresponding threshold 
in the absence of corruption, depending on the relative strength of the "market-share 
effect" and "incentive-to-cheat effect". Moreover, comparing social welfares, we find 
that a self-Iabelling scheme generally dominates third party labelling by either brown or 
green firms. The only exception to this occurs when the "market-share effect" greatly 
exceeds the "incentive-to-cheat effect", whence third party labelling by green firms 
becomes the most preferred option. 
Kirchhoff and Zago (2001) have analysed the optimality of costly third-party 
labelling policies for GM and non-GM food. They too find that third party labelling by 
non-GM firms (or what they term "voluntary labelling") is preferable to third party 
labelling by GM firms (or their "mandatory labelling") when the number of green 
consumers is less than a threshold, and vice versa. There is, however, an asymmetry in 
the financing of the two alternative labelling schemes in Kirchhoff and Zago's paper: 
when the non-GM firms label, they pay the cost ofthird party labelling; but when the GM 
firms label, the cost of third party labelling is borne by the government. This cost 
advantage to GM firms makes more consumers choose the GM variety than would be the 
case if GM firms had to bear their own labelling cost. We ignore such discriminatory 
behaviour on part of the government favouring the GM (or brown) firms, and assume that 
each type of firms pay the third party labelling cost when they do such labelling. Only the 
monitoring cost is borne by the government, for ail methods of labelling, in our paper. 
bribe from the brown firms in order to certity their products as green. However, we do not explore this 
scenario here. 
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Unlike us, Kirchhoff and Zago do not focus on enforcement problems, and hence do not 
distinguish between third party labelling cost and monitoring cost. Another difference 
between our paper and Kirchhoff and Zago (2001) is that they do not consider the self-
labelling option, which involves a monitoring but no labelling cost. Including this option 
in our analysis, we find that the self-Iabelling option generally dominates third party 
labelling, and should be preferred by the policymaker in most cases. 
Mason (2006) has analysed the welfare implications ofthird party eco-labelling as 
an imperfect and costly signal of quality. His random labelling process allows for both 
Type 1 (a green firm is mistakenly certified as brown) and Type II (brown firm certified 
as green) errors, and the rational expectation prices are determined in equilibrium using 
Bayes' rule. Mason shows that introduction of the eco-Iabelling option can increase or 
reduce social welfare, depending upon parameter values and whether firms have the 
option of choosing their production technology. One major difference of our paper with 
Mason's is that we do not consider unintentional errors in the labelling process. Instead 
we take into consideration incentives for firms to deliberately misuse the labelling 
process by taking recourse to dishonest means. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 oudines the model and 
solves for the full information equilibrium (benchmark case) when consumers can 
observe the product type and no labelling is required. Section 3.3 then looks at the 
asymmetric information case, when product types are unobservable, and labelling is 
always done truthfully. We show that the optimal third party labelling rule in this case 
depends on the market share of each good. Section 3.4 also considers the asymmetric 
information case, but allows for the possibility of cheating by firms with respect to theif 
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labels. The general dominance of self-Iabelling, when accompanied by random 
monitoring of green firms, is shown in this section. Section 3.5 provides a numerical 
example, while the last section concludes. 
3.2 First Best Outcome: Complete Information 
Consider a good that is vertically differentiated into two types - brown (type 1) and green 
(type 2) - with ail consumers preferring the latter to the former. Each type of the good is 
produced by a large number of identical firms under perfect competition with free entry 
and exit. The total cost ofproducing qi units oftype i good (i = 1,2) consists of the fixed 
cost Kj , and the variable cost Yz C j qi2 • We assume K 2 > KI and c2 > CI to represent a 
higher cost ofproducing the green variety. With Pi denoting the price of type i good, the 
profit of a representative type i firm producing qi units of type i good is 
(3.1) 
Each firm maximises profit with respect to quantity by taking price as given. Due to free 
entry/exit, the equilibrium profit of each firm is zero. This zero-profit condition, together 
with the first order condition (FOC) for profit maximisation, yields the equilibrium price 
and quantity as 
(3.2) 
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Note that q; is also the output that minimizes the average cost Yzcjqj + Kj / qj' Thus, in 
equilibrium, each firm produces at its minimum efficient scale. 
With complete information, consumers can observe the good's type. 13 It is 
assumed that each consumer inelastically demands one unit of the good, and is willing to 
pay (M - 0) dollars for the type 1 good, and M dollars for the type 2 good. 0 is a 
parameter that represents a consumer's measure of "distaste" for the brown good and is 
assumed to be uniformly distributed with support [0,1]. A consumer is indifferent 
between buying good of either type wh en M - 0 - p~ = M - p;. Thus the indifferent 
consumer has a threshold value of 0 given by 
(3.3) 
The consumers with distaste parameter less (more) than 0* will buy the brown (green) 
good under complete information, and can be interpreted as "brown (green) consumers". 
We assume that the parameters of our model are such that both types of the good are 
produced in equilibrium, i.e. 
Assumption Al: Costs are such that 0 < ~2c2K2 - ~2c1KI < 1. 14 
13 The first best outcome also results if the brown and/or green firms truthfully self·labelled their goods, 
and self-Iabelling is costless. 
14 Note that the higher fixed and unit costs ofproducing the green type ensures that O' is strictly positive. 
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Since each type i firm produces q; units of the good, the equilibrium number of 
type i firms, nj' , is 
The market equilibrium under full information as derived above can be shown to be 
socially optimal or first best. The social welfare is represented by 
8 1 
W = J(M -O)dO + JMdO -(KI + Yzclq~)81 ql - (K2 + Yzc2qi)(I- 0)/ q2 
o 8 
The first two terms on the R.H.S. of (3.5) represents the consumer surplus from the two 
types of the good, while the third and fourth terms represent the total industry costs of 
producing each type (aggregated across firms of the same type). Note that nI = 01 ql' 
while n2 = (1- 0) 1 q2. Hence, W represents the difference between consumer surplus 
and production costs in the economy. The social planner maximises W with respect to 0 
and qj. The FOCs are 
(3.6a) 
(3.6b) 
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From (3.6b), we have Ki = ~Ciq; , when (3.6a) becomes 
(3.6a') 
or, 
(3.6a") 
The expressions on each side of the above equation represent the difference between the 
surplus of the indifferent consumer and the marginal cost of production of the respective 
type of the good. In other words, the first-order conditions for welfare maximization 
represent the fact that the social planner decides the optimal allocation by equating the 
net marginal bene fit across the two types. Solving (3.6a) and (3.6b) we get the socially 
optimal levels of outputs and market share as 
q,/, = ~2Ki / Ci , 
()w = ~2C2K2 - ~2c1KI . 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
Comparing equations (3.2), (3.3), (3.7) and (3.8) we see that under full 
information the market outcome is socially optimal. This is the familiar result that, in the 
absence of imperfect competition and incomplete information (and externalities), markets 
are efficient. Substituting (3.2) and (3.3) into (3.5), gives the social welfare under full 
information as 
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(3.9) 
3.3 Incomplete Information with Truthful Labelling 
Now suppose that consumers cannot observe the good's type. No firm would have an 
incentive to produce the green good if it sold at a price equal to or lower than that of the 
brown. If the green good sold at a higher price than the brown, all brown firms would 
want to pretend to be green. Thus, there cannot be an equilibrium where differences in 
price signal the different types. Consequently, no firm would find it profitable to produce 
the green good at a higher cost. In such a situation, eco-Iabelling serves as a mechanism 
for the disclosure of information that enables the green firms to differentiate themselves, 
and the consumers to exercise their preferences for the hidden attribute. If there were no 
labelling, only the brown good would be sold in the associated uninformative 
equilibrium. 15 
In this section we assume that all labelling is done by a third party, and that this 
process results in accurate revelation of the type of good produced by any finn. If costless 
self-labelling is done truthfully, the outcome will be identical to that analysed in the 
previous section. Therefore, we focus on costly third party labelling, and ignore, for the 
time being, dishonest practices (such as use of spurious labels) by firms: all labels are 
genuine and issued by the third party as the certifying agency. Suppose that a type i firm 
IS Since we are concemed with a comparison of the different labelling methods, throughout this paper we 
assume that the labelling costs (introduced in this section) and monitoring costs (introduced in section 3.4) 
are sufficiently small such that the social planner always prefers the informative equilibrium (with 
labelling) to the uninformative outcome (without labelling). This will usually be the case, more so when the 
production or consumption of the brown good results in a convexly increasing negative extemality: then 
there will be an additional social bene fit of choosing the informative equilibrium (where both brown and 
green goods are present) rather than the uninformative equilibrium (where the entire market is served by 
the brown good). However, for expositional simplicity, we do not mode! extemality in this paper. 
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has to pay the labelling agency a fee li for each unit of output that carries the label. 16 We 
assume that li represents the entire (social) cost of producing and affixing the third-party 
label on each unit of the type i goOd. 17 This could be either because (i) the labelling 
agency is a non-profit organisation making zero profit (i.e. its revenue from labelling fees 
exactly covers its total cost of verification/certification), or because (ii) the labelling 
agency is foreign owned. 18 Either way, the labelling agency's profit (if any) does not 
enter social welfare. Since there are only two types of firms, labels ean be used by either 
the brown or the green firms. Each case is analysed below separately to determine the 
socially optimal alternative. 
Case A: Labelling by Brown Firms 
Suppose third party labelling is made mandatory for the brown firms. The profit of each 
brown firm then is Plql - KI - Yz clq~ -llql' The FOC for profit maximisation and the 
zero-profit condition together give the new equilibrium priee and quantity for brown 
firms as l9 
16 Germany's Green Dot programme, for example, charges a labelling fee which depends on the type and 
weight of packaging materials. Many other eco-label programmes, such as the EU's Eco-label, charge an 
advalorem labelling fee which is a fixed percentage of the label-using firm's annual sales. Although our 
model uses a unit labelling fee for computational convenience, an advalorem labelling fee will not 
~ualitatively alter our results (see footnote 19). 
1 Labelling costs are likely to be lower for brown firms. For genetically modified crops, however, the 
labelling agency might have to perform the same test to determine whether a crop is brown (genetic 
modification present) or green (genetic modification absent), in which case II could be equal to 12• Note that 
the results of our analysis remain qualitatively unchanged even if II = O. 
18 For example, the Nordic Council countries allow foreign manufacturers to use the Nordic Swan label in 
the manufacturers' own country. 
19 To see why an advalorem labelling fee would not alter our results qualitatively, suppose the labelling 
agency charges a type i firm a fraction SI of its sales as labelling fee. When brown firms label, the profit of 
a brown firm is (l-s l )p,q, -K, - ~c,q:. Then the brown good's price rises to p~ = p; /(l-s,) , but 
each brown firm's output remains unchanged (q~ = q;). 
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(3.10) 
Since the green firms do not label, their equilibrium price-quantity combination remains 
unchanged. The market share of the brown good therefore decreases to 
A • A • () = P2 - PI = () -II' (3.11) 
where ()* is given by (3.3). To mie out corner solutions, where only one type of the good 
is produced, we make the following assumption: 
Assumption A2: The labelling cost is such that II < ~2C2K2 - ~2c.K. < 1-/2 holds. 20 
Remark: For ail li E rO,I), if A2 is satisfied, then Al is satisfied as weil. AIso, A2 implies 
that 1. + 12 < 1. 
Since each brown firm continues to produce the previously optimallevel of output 
(q: = q;), I( / q; brown firms have to exit the market when eco-Iabelling is made 
mandatory for them. Their place is taken up by l( / q; new green firms entering the 
market. Social welfare in case A is 
20 0' < 1-/2 is necessary to ensure OB < 1 in case B. 
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(3.12) 
Thus incomplete information imposes a welfare loss on society which, when brown firms 
loss inereases as E/ rises. 
Case B: Labelling by Green Firms 
Suppose third party labelling is done by the green firms instead. Proceeding as in case A, 
it can be shown that equilibrium priee and quantity, when green firms label, are 
(3.13) 
Increase in priee of the green good, raises the market share of the brown good to 
B B" () = P2 - PI = () + /2' (3.14) 
/2 / q; green firms exit the market and are replaeed by /2 / q: brown firms. Moreover, 
social welfare when green firms label is 
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(3.15) 
Again, W* - WB = 12 (1- .Yi 12 - 0*) > 0 and a(w* - WB) 1 ao' = -/2 < o. Thus, welfare 
loss, when green firms label, decreases as 0* rises. 
From (3.11), (3.12), (3.14) and (3.15), it is easy to derive that WB ~ W A if and 
, 12 -p + 21 A 
on1y if 0 ~ 1 2 2 == o. Thus, we have 
2(l1 + 12 ) 
Proposition 1: Provided labelling is done truthfully, third party labelling under 
incomplete information should be undertaken by green firms if and only if market share 
• A 
of the brown good in the first best case, 0 , exceeds the threshold value 0, as defined 
above. 
When aIl firms are honest, there is no need for monitoring, and the only social 
cost involved is the labelling cost. Since self-labelling solves the information asymmetry 
problem costlessly, truthful self-labelling will trivially lead to first best outcome. 
Between third party labelling by browns (case A) and third party labelling by greens 
(case B), the more efficient policy is the one which involves a lower labelling co st. Total 
labelling cost under either policy depends upon two factors: (i) the amount of goods to be 
labelled, which is determined by the equilibrium market split OA or OB, and Cii) the unit 
cost of labelling the goods, Il or 12 • In fact, if labelling costs are the same for both brown 
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A 
and green types (i.e. II = 12 ), then e = .Yi, i.e. third party labelling should be done by 
producers of the type that has the smaller market share in the first best case. 
3.4 Incomplete Information with Cheating and Monitoring 
In the previous section we assumed that ail labelling is do ne truthfully. However, in 
reality, labelling may be subject to corruption. Specifically, brown firms have an 
incentive to pretend to be green in order to bene fit from the higher price of the green 
good. In this section we allow for the possibility that firms can cheat with respect to their 
labels, i.e., make false claims or affix spurious labels to their product that are not the 
authentic ones provided by the certifying agency?l 
When brown firms can cheat and pretend to be green, the government has to 
monitor the "green" firms in order to ensure that labelling is done truthfully or by the 
proper agent. We assume that the government is able to pre-commit to its monitoring 
frequency. This allows the government to move first, and set the level of inspections, 
before the firms take their decisions.22 Suppose the government decides to randomly 
inspect m "green" firms for the accuracy of their labels, and imposes a fine of an amount 
F on any brown firm caught pretending to be green. F is assumed to be an exogenous 
parameter, perhaps set by the judiciary, but outside government control. To achieve 
complete deterrence at minimum cost, the government has to choose a sufficiently high 
m such that the expected penalty offsets the extra profit from cheating. We assume that 
21 Recall that we ignoring the case where the labelling agency itself is corruptible. 
22 The Iiterature on monitoring and enforcement of regulation models monitoring both with, and without, 
pre-commitment. The prominent papers that introduced the regulator as a first-moyer who pre-commits to a 
monitoring strategy are, among others, Becker (1968) and Polinsky and Shayell (1979). Grieson and Singh 
(1990) proyide the pioneering analysis of a monitoring game without pre-commitment. They examine a 
regulator and an agent making inspecting and compliance decisions in a simultaneous moye game that has 
a mixed strategy outcome. We choose the former approach for simplicity of exposition. 
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if its expected net profit from cheating is zero, then a firm does not cheat. If n2 is the 
total number of green firms in the industry, then the detection probability of a brown firm 
that cheats is m / n2 , and its expected fine is mF / n2 • Clearly, if the fine can be made 
arbitrarily large, the number of firms the government needs to inspect will go to zero. 
However, social conventions (such as "penalty should be commensurate with crime") 
inhibit the setting of extreme penalties in our paper. The remainder ofthis section sets out 
three alternative labelling-policy options available to the government, and th en goes on to 
compare their welfare implications. 
3.4.1 Equilibrium under Three Labelling Options 
When brown firms can cheat, and the government has to randomly monitor the "green" 
firms, it has three options with respect to its labelling policy: (i) it can impose third party 
labelling on the brown firms, or (ii) it can ask the green firms to undertake third party 
labelling, or (iii) it can ask the green and/or the brown firms to self-label their own 
products. For each of the three cases, we shall now analyse the equilibrium under optimal 
deterrence activity by the government. 
When the government makes third party labelling mandatory for the brown firms 
(as in Section 3.3, Case A), the price of the brown good rises by the amount of the 
labelling cost to p~, and the brown good's market share falls to BA. With mandatory 
labelling, a brown firm can pretend to be green by simply not obtaining a label from the 
labelling agency. The profit that a brown firm can get by not obtaining a label is 
1ft = ptql - KI - Yz clq~ (a tilde over a variable denotes its value in the cheating case). 
The corrupt brown firm maximises this profit by producing quantity 'ifIA = pt / CI . Since 
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optimal inspections, no brown firm will have the incentive to cheat. Thus, total number of 
green firms in equilibrium, when brown firms have to label, is n: = (1 - eA ) / q; . 
On the other hand, wh en green firms obtain a label from the labelling agency (as 
in Section 3.3, Case B), the priee of the green good rises to P: , and its market share falls 
to (1- 0 8 ). With labelling being done by green firms, a brown firm can pretend to be 
green by carrying a fake label. We assume that this spurious label- perhaps an imitation 
of the label or certificate issued by the labelling agency to green firms - is costless to the 
firms.23 The profit that a brown firm can get by using a fake label is 
monitoring, the total number of green firms, when green firms bear the labelling cost, 
A third option for the government is to require the brown and/or green firms to 
self-label their product. Unlike third party labelling, self-labelling is costless. Hence, 
under self-Iabelling, the price of the type i good remains unchanged at Pi" and the 
market share of the brown good stays at 0'. The cheating profit of a brown firm, which 
self-labels itself as green, then is or maximised 
labelling is n; = (1- e*) / q;, with n: < n; < n: . 
23 We are referring only to the direct cost of obtaining fake labels here. Indirect cost of using fake labels 
will include the expected fine. A green firm will never use a fake label to save on its labelling cost, as the 
expected fine will exceed its extra profit. We are assuming that brown firms and green firms are fined the 
same amount, F, for using fake labels. 
24 Superscript S stands for "self-labelling". 
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As mentioned earlier, the government chooses the number of green firms it 
randomly monitors, m , such that the amount of fine any brown firm considering cheating 
expects to pay (= mF / n2 ) equals the extra profit this firm expects to get from such 
cheating (iiIA , or iilB , or iit, depending on the labelling policy adopted by the 
government). Thus, when it imposes third party labelling on brown firms, the optimal 
number of firms that the government has to inspect in order to ensure an expected fine of 
(3.16) 
where iilA == (c2K 2 - clKl ) / Cl > o. If monitoring each firm costs the government an 
amount h, social welfare under third party labelling by brown firms would be 
(3.17) 
On the other hand, the number of firms that the government has to monitor, when 
third party labelling is done by green firms, is 
(3.18) 
where ii: == iit + /2 (~2C2K2 + Yz /2)/ Cl . The associated social welfare is 
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(3.19) 
Finally, under self-Iabelling, the government has to inspect mS firms in order to 
deter brown firms from cheating, where 
(3.20) 
Social welfare under self-labeUing is given by 
(3.21) 
3.4.2 Third Party Labelling by Green vs. Brown Firms 
Costly third party labelling by green rather than brown firms leads to a higher priee of the 
green good. This has two opposing effects on the number of firms the government has to 
inspect. First, it increases the incentive of a brown firm to cheat, as it can get a higher 
profit from cheating ("incentive-to-cheat effect"). This implies that the government will 
have to increase the detection probability by inspecting more firms, so as to deter brown 
firms from cheating. Secondly, however, an increase in priee ofthe green good decreases 
its market share, and results in fewer numbers of green firms, as sorne green firms exit 
the market ("market share effect"). The lower total number of green firms implies that the 
government has to inspect fewer firms in order to attain the probability of detection that 
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deters brown firms from cheating. When the "incentive-to-cheat effect" dominates the 
"market share effect", m B exceeds mA, i.e. the government has to inspect more firms 
when it imposes third party labelling requirement on green firms rather than on brown 
firms (and vice versa). 
Comparing (3.17) and (3.19), we find that welfare under third party labelling by 
green firms exceeds that under third party labelling by brown firms (i.e. W B ~ W A) if and 
only if O' ~ ê + h(m B - mA )/(/( + 12 ) == 8. Thus, we have the following result: 
Proposition 2: When the government has to monitor in order to prevent brown jirms 
from cheating, third party labelling should be done by green jirms (i. e. W B ~ W A ) if and 
A 
only if o' ~ ê (as dejined above). 
When firms can cheat, there are two sources of social welfare loss: the third party 
labelling cost, and the monitoring co st. Proposition 1 showed that, in the absence of 
cheating, the third party labelling cost involved is lower with green firms labelling as 
long as O' ~ ê. However, once monitoring costs are included, we get a new threshold 
market share ê , which can be higher or lower than ê depending on the relative strengths 
of the "incentive to cheat" and "market share" effects. For instance, if the "incentive to 
cheat effect" exceeds the "market share effect", the government has to monitor more 
A 
firms when the green firms label (i.e. mB > mA), and we have ê < ê. Then, ev en if 
A 
• ~ • A 
o > 0, the green firms should not undertake third party labelling as long as 0 < 0, as 
the additional monitoring cost dominates the lower labelling cost. 
99 
3.4.3 Self-Iabelling vs. Third Party Labelling by Brown Firms 
Since self-Iabelling is costless to firms, it does not increase the price of either good. 
Costly third party labelling by brown firms, on the other hand, increases the price of the 
brown good but leaves the price of the green good unchanged. The incentive of a brown 
firm to cheat is, therefore, the same irrespective of whether the government imposes self-
labelling or third party labelling on brown firms (cheating profit equals 1ft = 1f\s in either 
case). However, third party labelling by brown firms increases the market share of the 
green good. This implies that the government has to inspect more firms under third party 
labelling than under self-labelling. Moreover, third party labelling imposes a labelling 
cost on society, which self-labelling does not impose. Thus, we have 
Proposition 3: When firms can cheat and monitoring is required for enforcement of 
labelling rules, self-labelling is better than third party labelling by brown firms, as if 
imposes less (labelling and monitoring) costs on society. 
Using (3.17) and (3.21), the difference in welfare between self-Iabelling vs. third party 
labelling by brown firms can be solved as 
(3.22) 
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Note that the first term on the R.H.S. of (3.22) represents the savings in labelling 
cost from the self-Iabelling option, and is strietly positive given Assumption A2. 
Proposition 3 justifies why ail existing third party labels are 'positive' (green), and not 
'negative' (brown), in character. Negative labels, in practice, tend to be mandatory self-
labels that brown manufacturers are required to attach to their product (for example, 
pesticide labelling un der FIFRA in the US)?5,26 
3.4.4 Self-Iabelling vs. Third Party Labelling by Green Firms 
Compared to self-Iabelling by brown and/or green firms, third party labelling by green 
firms, which raises the priee of the green good, has three effects on welfare. For one, 
brown firms have a higher incentive to cheat, which implies that the government has to 
inspect more firms. For another, as the market share of the green good falls, the 
government has to inspect fewer firms. Thirdly, third party labelling reduces welfare by 
imposing the labelling cost on society.27 The first ("incentive to cheat") and the third 
effects favour self-Iabelling, whereas the second ("market share") effect favours third 
party labelling by greens. The relative strengths of these three effects determine whether 
the government should opt for self-Iabelling or third party labelling by green firms. Using 
(3.19) and (3.21), the welfare difference between these two labelling options can be 
expressed as 
25 Manufacturers may also voluntarily attach hazard/warning labels on their products for liability purposes 
(US EPA, 1998). 
26 An exception to Proposition 3 could exist if production or consumption of brown goods created a 
negative externality. In such a case, the reduction in the negative externality due to imposition of costly 
third party labelling on brown firms would have to be incorporated into the social welfare as weil. The 
labelling fee would then act like a Pigouvian tax on the brown firms. 
27 Note that this is dependent on the assumption that third party labelling is costlier than self-Iabelling (a 
zero cost activity in this paper). This assumption, however, is quite realistic given that third party labelling 
is likely to involve tests and verifications. 
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(3.23) 
The first term on the R.H.S. of (3.23) represents the savings in labelling cost from the 
self-Iabelling option, and is positive by Assumption A2. The second term on the R.H.S. 
represents the differences in the monitoring cost required to enforce the two labelling 
policies; it is negative if and only if the "market share effect" exceeds the "incentive to 
cheat effect". Thus we have the following result: 
Proposition 4: If the government has to inspect more firms when it imposes third party 
labelling on the green firms than when it imposes self-labelling (i.e. mB > mS J, then the 
government should choose the self-labelling option. Self-labelling is also optimal if mS 
slightly exceeds mB • Only if mS is sufficiently larger than mB , 28 so that the 10wer 
monitoring cost compensates the additionallabelling cost, should the government opt for 
third party labelling by greenfirms rather than self-labelling. 
Thus, self-Iabelling emerges as the best labelling method in most cases. The only 
exception to this occurs when fewer firms have to be monitored under third party 
labelling by green firms (Le. "market share effect" exceeds "incentive to cheat effect"), 
and the monitoring cost is very high. Under such exceptional circumstances, third party 
labelling by green firms becomes the most socially desirable option. This is because the 
28 Specifically, if mS > mB + /2(1- 0* - JI,./2)/ h . Note that higher the monitoring cost (h), \ower will be 
the amount by which mS has to exceed mB. 
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monitoring cost savings associated with third party labelling by green firms exceeds the 
savings in labelling cost associated with self-Iabelling. 
3.5 Numerical Analysis 
This section provides a numerical example to support our analytical results. Suppose the 
various parameters in our model take the following values: 
CI =1.9, C2 =2, KI =99, K 2 =100, M=25, II =0.01, 12 =0.1, F=50. 
Then the first-best market share of the brown good is e* = 0.6. When ail firms act 
honestly (and, therefore, without any monitoring), the threshold market share, as defined 
in Proposition l, is Ô = 0.86. Since e* < Ô , third party labelling should be imposed on 
brown firms, as the associated social welfare (W A = 5.18) is greater than that when green 
firms do such labelling (WB = 5.15) . 
When the firms are dishonest, and monitoring is necessary for enforcement, 
suppose the monitoring cost is h = 5 . Then the new threshold market share, as given by 
A A 
Proposition 2, is Ô = 0.83. Since e* < Ô, third party labelling should still be imposed on 
the brown rather than green firms, as the former policy gives higher welfare (W A = 5.15) 
than the latter (WB = 5.13). Self-Iabelling, however, gives the highest level of welfare, 
WS =5.16. 
Alternatively, suppose the monitoring cost is much higher, say h = 55. In this 
A 
case Ô = 0.49, and third party labelling by green firms becomes the most preferred 
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option, yielding welfare of WB = 4.945 . The welfare levels associated with third party 
labelling by brown firms and self-Iabelling are, respectively, WA = 4.93 and WS = 4.94. 
In both cases (Le. when h = 5 and h = 55) self-Iabelling is always better than 
third party labelling by brown firms, as suggested by Proposition 3. However, the best 
policy differs in the two case: self labelling is optimal when the monitoring co st is low; 
otherwise, third party labelling by green firms is superior, as indicated by Proposition 4. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This paper has analysed the optimality of different labelling policies for credence goods 
when firms can cheat with respect to the label carried by their products. Labelling as an 
information disclosure mechanism becomes important when consumers care about an 
attribute of a product that is unobservable to them. For example, although sorne 
consumers may be averse to buying carpets which are manufactured using child-Iabour, 
they will not be able to make an informed choice unless they can distinguish between 
carpets which do and do not use child-Iabour. We show that, iffirms honestly implement 
the labelling policy, then the government should impose costly third party labelling 
requirement on the brown firms if and only if the brown good's market share under 
complete information (O') is below a threshold (Ô) .29 Of course, when firms always 
label honestly, the self-Iabelling policy would trivially lead to the first best outcome, and 
would be most preferable. 
More realistically, when firms can be corrupt in their implementation of the 
public labelling policy, the government will have to undertake costly monitoring of firms 
29 Recall O' = ~2c2K2 - ~2cl KI reflects the difference in production cost of the green and brown firms. ' 
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in order to deter brown firrns from cheating and pretending to be green. In such a 
situation, we show that costly third party labelling may have to be imposed on the brown 
rather than green firms even if the brown good's complete information market share 
exceeded ê. As weil, we find that self-Iabelling by brown and/or green firms is always 
preferable to third party labelling by brown firrns, and mostly preferable to third party 
labelling by green firms. The latter is preferable to self-Iabelling only when the "market 
share effect" exceeds the "incentive-to-cheat effect", so that the government has to 
monitor more firms under self-Iabelling, and the monitoring cost is very high. 
This paper has simplistically assumed that the fee charged by the labelling agency 
represents the social cost of labelling. In future work we intend to explicitly model the 
labelling agency's incentives and costs. 
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Chapter 4 
Exact Methods for Calculating the Ove rail Energy 
Intensity Decline Rate from Sectoral Improvements in 
Energy Efficiency 106 
4.1 Introduction 
One measure of the role of energy, and the efficiency with which it is used, is 
energy intensity, the ratio of energy used per unit (real dollar) of output. Energy 
intensity can be measured at the individual industry or activity level, at a regional 
or national level, or on a global average basis. The International Energy Agency 
(IEA), and the United States' Energy Information Administration (ElA) gather 
data that can be used to calculate energy intensity on a variety of bases. 
Smil (2003) demonstrates that the reliability of energy intensity ratios are 
in doubt, particularly because of measurement errors and differences in the ways 
in which energy on the one hand, and output on the other, are accounted for. An 
illustrative example is Smil's (2003; p. 75) demonstration that large inter-country 
differences in energy intensity almost disappear when the output is measured on a 
purchasing-power-parity basis rather than using the market exchange rate. While 
Smil is right that difficulties with the energy intensity concept, and measures of it, 
must be kept in mind, this paper focuses on first differences (changes over time) 
in energy intensity. As long as there is sorne time consistency in the measure of 
106 This essay is co-authored with Chris Green. 
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energy and output, first differences should minimize any problems with using the 
concept of energy intensity. 
Energy intensity, and its rate of change over time, occupies a central role 
in the c1imate change debate. It is increasingly widely understood that 
anthropogenically induced climate change is essentially an energy problem. The 
combustion of fossil fuels for energy purposes is the chief source of carbon 
dioxide (COÛ emissions, the main greenhouse gas. Thus, the type of energy, and 
its use and conversion efficiencies are important parts of the climate change 
picture. 
To be more precise, future projections (scenarios) of greenhouse gas 
emissions depend not only on projections of population growth and economic 
(energy-using) activities per-capita, but also on changes in energy intensity and 
the degree to which future energy sources are carbon (or emission) -free. The 
Kaya Identity (Kaya, 1989) makes this relationship c1ear: 
y E C C=Px-x-x-
P y E' 
(4.1) 
where C = Carbon emissions, P = Population, Y = Gross Domestic Product, and 
E= Energy. Hoffert et al. (1998), for example, used the Kaya Identity to compute 
global anthropogenic C02 emission in 1990 as follows: 5.3 x 109 persons 
x 4,100 $ per person per year x 0.49 watt year per $ x 0.56 kg C per watt year ;:::: 
6 GtC per year. \07 
\071 GtC == 1012 kg Carbon. 
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The energy intensity variable in the Kaya Identity is ElY. Over time, 
energy intensity is expected to decline with energy-efficiency-increasing 
technological progress. I08 However, in rapidly industrializing countries ElY may 
increase as economic activity shifts from lower (e.g. peasant agriculture, fishing 
and trading) to higher (e.g. steel and cement production, chemical and petroleum 
processing, and paper making) energy intensive activities. But once 
industrialization is achieved, and high incomes result in increased demand for 
professional and commercial services and activities, there will be a shift toward 
less energy intensive activities. The combination of (i) energy efficiency 
improvements, and (ii) sectoral shifts in economic activities, will determine the 
direction and magnitude of change in ove rail (i.e. aggregated across the different 
sectors of an economy) energy intensity, ElY. lt, therefore, becomes useful to 
convert the Kaya Identity to a rate of change over time form: 
. . . 
C = p+ (Y 1 P)+ (E 1 Y)+ (C 1 E), (4.2) 
where a dot over a variable denotes its rate of change over time. On a global 
. 
average basis, the annual rate of decline in energy intensity, (E 1 Y), has been in 
the neighbourhood of 1 percent on a market exchange rate basis (0.7 percent on a 
purchasing power parity basis) over the past century (Smil, 2003).109 An 
important question is whether a 1 percent rate of decline in global average annual 
energy intensity can be improved upon over the course of the 21 S! century. Or, 
\08 Energy efficiency, the inverse of energy intensity, is defined as output per unit energy. It refers 
to irnprovements in fuel econorny, power plant heat rates, building operations, and industrial 
processes (Laitner, 2004). 
109 Decarbonization of energy has reduced the global carbon intensity of energy, (C i E), by about 
0.3 percent on an average annual basis. 
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alternatively, will it become more difficult to maintain a 1 percent rate of decline, 
as the best improvements in energy efficiency, and the largest gains from sectoral 
output shifts, are "used up". That these are important questions for climate policy 
is indicated in the papers by Hoffert, et al. (1998,2002). 
Hoffert, et al. (1998) demonstrates that large amounts of carbon-free 
energy would be required to stabilize the atmospheric concentration of C02, even 
at a level double the pre-industrial one of approximately 275 ppmv. They show 
that, given population and output (GDP) per capita growth projections employed 
in the 1990s by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2000), the 
amount of carbon-free energy required to stabilize the atmospheric concentration 
of C02 at 550 ppmv would be 37 TW (or 1165 EJ/yr).110 But this estimate 
assumed that the global average annuai rate of decline in energy intensity 
throughout the 21 st century would be maintained at 1 percent. If, in contrast, the 
average annual rate of decline cou Id be raised (fel!) to 1.5 (0.8) percent, the 
amount of carbon-emission-free power required for stabilization would be 19 (50) 
TW. 
Reducing uncertainty about the future rate of decline in energy intensity 
would reduce uncertainty about future carbon emissions, and the amount of 
carbon-free energy required for climate stabilization. This, however, requires the 
future rate of decline in overall energy intensity to be estimated correctly. The 
purpose ofthis paper is to specify exact methods for computing the rate of decline 
in overall energy intensity by appropriately aggregating its two determinants -
energy efficiency improvements in different economic activities, and sectoral 
shifts between economic activities that have different energy intensities. 
1 \0 1 Terawatt (TW) "l31.5 Exajoules (El) per year, is a measure of power (energy per unit of 
time). 
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One of the first systematic attempts to measure the economy-wide energy 
intensity was made in a 1995 report by the Energy Information Administration 
(ElA) of the United States' Department of Energy. 1 Il The ElA broadly divided the 
US economy into four "energy end-use" sectors - residential, transportation, 
industrial and commercial- and attempted to estimate the energy intensity of each 
sector by devising suitable indicators. Then it proceeded to measure the change in 
the economy-wide energy intensity level by using its sectoral energy intensity 
measures. However, as we show in Appendix 4.1 (using notations defined in the 
next section of this paper), the methodology followed by ElA for aggregating its 
sectoral measures was incorrect. 
In section 4.2 we lay out formulas for measuring the overall rate of energy 
intensity decline by appropriately combining the sectoral improvements in energy 
efficiency. Then, in section 4.3, we show how the formulas can be used to identifY 
implausible energy intensity decline scenarios, and thus reduce uncertainty about 
its future rate of decline. In order to do this, we use the sectoral energy efficiency 
improvements estimated by Lightfoot and Green (2001). Concluding comments 
are given in section 4.4. 
4.2 Calculating the Overall Energy Intensity Decline Rate 
In this section we present formulas for caIculating the reduction in ove rail (Le. 
economy-wide) energy intensity attributable to (i) improvements in energy 
efficiency in the various sectors of the economy (technological change), and (ii) 
III The report noted that, "This publication is not a final product, but is EIA's first attempt to 
define and measure energy efficiency in a systematic and robust manner for each of the sectors and 
the United States' economy as a whole" (ElA, 1995, p. vii). 
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sectoral shifts in economic activities that have differing energy intensities and 
energy shares (structural change). 
Consider an economy divided into n sectors. 112 Let ej and yj respectively 
denote the energy used, and output (or GDP) generated, by sector i in the base or 
"initial" year. A prime over a variable is used to denote the value of the variable 
in the future or "final" year. For instance, y; denotes the amount of output 
generated (at base year prices) by sector i in the "final" year. The energy share 
and output share of sector i in the base year are then respectively given as 
n n 
ej / E == Zj and Yj / Y == gj' where E == L ej and Y == LYj are total energy and 
j;J j;J 
output in the base year. The percentage increase in energy efficiency of sector i, 
between the base and final years, is denoted by Sj' i.e. 1 + Sj = (y; / en /(Y j / ej ) . 
Then, the percentage decline in energy intensity over time for the entire economy, 
denoted by R, can be expressed as 
l+R==--=L ej ej Yj ~ =L Zj--gj . E' / Y' n { (' / ' ) , / y,} n { 1 ' } 
E / Y j;J E eJ Yj yj / Y j;J 1 + Sj gj (4.3) 
Equation (4.3) shows that to calculate the average rate of energy intensity decline 
for the entire economy, we need information on (i) the initial year energy share of 
each sector (Zj)' (ii) the improvement in energy efficiency of each sector (1 + Sj) , 
and (iii) the ratio of final-to-initial year output share of each sector (g; / gj) .113 
112 The analysis that folJows can be generalized to incorporate sub-sectors within a sector. 
JI3 Suppose the "initial" year is 1990 and the "final" year is 2100. Then the first information can be 
obtained from historica1 data, while the last two will involve future projections. 
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Given these three pieces of information, the final year energy share of each sector 
can then be derived as 
(4.4) 
An alternative way to calculate the economy-wide decline in energy 
intensity, R, is to use the identity 1 + R == 1/(1 + S) , where 1 + S is given by 
Equation (4.5) shows that an alternative information set can be used to calculate 
the energy intensity decline for the entire economy: (i) the initial year output share 
of each sector (g;), (ii) the energy efficiency improvement rate of each sector 
(1 + s;), and (Hi) the ratio of final-to-initial year energy share of each sector 
(z; / z;). Given this alternative information set, the final year output share of each 
sector can then be obtained as 
(4.6) 
One implication that emerges from (4.4) and (4.6) is that constant sectoral 
output shares over time (i.e. g; = g;) do not, in general, imply constant sectoral 
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energy shares over time (Le. Zj :;:. z;), and vice versa. The exception to this is the 
highly unlikely case when energy efficiency improvements, Si' are identical for 
ail sectors, in which case gi = g; ~ Zi = z; . 
4.3 Future Energy Intensity Decline Scenarios 
The formulas developed in the previous section can aid the construction of 
"realistic" greenhouse gas emission scenarios, such as those do ne by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2000). These scenarios 
themselves depend on what rates of future energy intensity decline one considers 
plausible. 114 Since equation (4.4) and (4.6) establishes a one-to-one relationship 
between future output shares (g;) and future energy shares (z;), this helps to 
eliminate scenarios involving "unrealistic" values for either sectoral shares. To 
iIIustrate this, we use the Lightfoot and Green (2001) estimates for maximum 
attainable improvements in energy efficiency for different energy end-use 
sectors. 115 Improvements in energy efficiency are limited by physical 
(thermodynamic) constraints in Lightfoot and Green (2001). Following them, we 
assume that the maximum attainable improvements are achieved by the year 2100. 
Moreover, since Lightfoot and Green use primary energy, they include "electricity 
generation" as an end-use sector. 116 
114 In IPCC' s forty SRES scenarios, global average annual rate of energy intensity decline over 
1990-2100 ranges from 0.57 to 2.18 percent. 
115 Lightfoot and Green (2001) also attempted to compute the future rate of decline in overall 
energy intensity, for the world as a who1e, using their sectoral estimates. However, they too used 
an inaccurate methodology for the aggregation. 
116 Primary energy is defined as ail energy consumed by end users, excluding electricity but 
including the energy consumed at e1ectric utilities to generate e1ectricity. Note that electricity is a 
carrier, and not a source, of energy. Primary energy thus inc1udes energy lost in the generation, 
transmission and distribution of electricity. 
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The data needed to estimate the global average rate of energy intensity 
decline are presented in Table 4.1. Assuming future (2100) sectoral output shares 
as given by column 5, the global average annual rate of energy intensity decline is 
computed as 0.96 percent, using equation (4.3).117 The implied future sectoral 
energy shares, calculated using equation (4.4), are reported in column 6. The 
future output and energy shares in Table 4.1 seem plausible in our judgment. To 
analyze the sensitivity of the overall energy intensity decline rate to different 
assumptions of future output (and the associated energy) shares, we report sorne 
other scenarios in Table 4.2. We are mainly interested in more "likely" cases, ones 
in which the energy share of the electricity generation sector rises from its current 
37.5 percent to 40-50 percent;118 the transportation energy share moves between 
15 and 30 percent (its current share is 18.6 percent); and the large, hypothesized 
decline in the energy and output shares of the industrial sector is, at least partly, 
taken up in energy and output shares of the commercial sector. We are particularly 
concerned to capture the predicted and ongoing ri se in the output share of the 
"commercial sector" (which includes retail and wholesale trade, and professional 
services such as health, education, finance and real estate). The output share of the 
commercial sector has been growing rapidly in developed countries, and can be 
expected to grow worldwide as developing countries become developed. 
117 Given any ratio of final year to initial year energy intensity, the annual rate of decline in energy 
intensity depends on the number of years involved. Note that, following Lightfoot and Green 
(2001), we have assumed that their maximum attainable energy efficiency improvements are 
achieved by 2100, which gives us 110 years from 1990. This also facilitates comparison with 
IPCC (2000). 
liS The role of electricity in the energy mix has been growing over time (EP A, 1995, p. 47). Smil 
(2003; p. 365) aIso argues that with a third of the world still not on the electricaI grid, the relative 
importance of the e\ectricity generation sector is virtually certain to grow. Note that even if 
hydrogen partly replaced electricity as a carrier of energy in the future, our analyses would not 
drastically change, as hydrogen is also associated with large production, transmission, and 
distribution losses. 
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Scenarios A, Band C in Table 4.2, which involve plausible assumptions 
about the future sectoral shares, yield an average annual energy intensity decline 
rate of 0.9, 1.05 and 1.03 percent, respectively. On the other han d, the energy 
intensity decline rate for scenarios D, F and Gare, respectively, 0.56, 1.3 and 1.32 
percent. Scenarios D, F and G, are however, associated with unlikely future 
sectoral shares. In scenario D and F, the future output share of the commercial 
sector is too low. Moreover, the output share of the industrial sector in scenario F 
is too high. In scenario G, energy share of the electricity generation sector is too 
low (see footnote 13). 
Although we do not report them here, we constructed many other 
scenarios in our preliminary research using various other combinations of future 
sectoral shares. However, for ail the "likely" scenarios, the global average rate of 
energy intensity decline ranged between 0.9 to 1.2 percent per annum. This calls 
into question the appropriateness of the (implicit) assumptions about inter-sectoral 
shares made by those who suggest a much larger (~2 to 3 percent per annum) rate 
of decline in overall energy intensity over the course of the next century (see for 
example, Laitner, 2004). 
Sorne have criticized the Lightfoot-Green energy efficiency improvement 
estimates as being on the conservative side, as these only take into account 
"device", but not "systems", efficiencies. Harvey (2003), for example, has 
conjectured that the energy efficiency of buildings (systems) could be raised as 
much as 600 percent (which is much higher than the 200 percent figure used by 
Lightfoot and Green), by combining architectural innovations and advanced 
building materials in such a way that most energy requirements for space heating, 
cooling, air filtering and Iighting wou Id be obviated. Although it is questionable 
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whether systems efficiencies would allow, on a global average scale, energy 
efficiency increases that are much larger than the ones employed by Lightfoot and 
Green, it is interesting to investigate the implications of very large energy 
efficiency increases in the downstream end-use sectors (i.e. transportation, 
residential, industrial, and commercial).119 
Table 4.3 modifies the energy efficiency improvement numbers used in 
Table 4.1 for the downstream end-use sectors. Specifically, in Table 4.3, we 
assume that energy efficiency in the residential and commercial sectors increases 
by 600 percent (instead of 300 percent and 200 percent, respectively, in Table 
4.1), white that in the transportation and industrial sectors increases by 400 
percent (instead of 200 percent). Surprisingly, even these large increases in 
sectoral energy efficiency improvements raise the ove rail energy intensity decline 
rate by a modest amount - from 0.96 percent to 1.21 percent per annum. On the 
other hand, if energy efficiency in the electricity generation sector also rose by 
200 percent (instead of 85 percent), the overall energy intensity decline rate jumps 
to 1.44 percent per annum. This shows that the Iimited scope of energy efficiency 
improvement in the electricity generation sector acts as a drag on the ability of the 
overall energy intensity rate to decline rapidly, even when ail the other end-use 
sectors experience very large improvements in energy efficiency. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This paper develops exact formulas for computing the economy-wide weighted 
average energy intensity decline associated with estimates of sectoral energy 
119 As noted by Lightfoot and Green (200 l, p. 12), "although major reductions in energy intensity 
are possible in transportation, residential, industrial and commercial, there are limits on 
improvement in energy efficiency for electricity generation, a sector which is likely to increase in 
relative importance and limit the overall world energy intensity decline." This is due to the state of 
the technology in the upstream electricity generation sector. 
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efficiency improvements, and shifts in sectoral output shares. Section 4.2 shows 
that in order to compute the rate of decline in overall energy intensity over a 
period of time, we need information about (i) initial year energy (respectively, 
output) share of each sector, (ii) the energy efficiency improvements in each 
sector, and (iii) the ratio of final year to initial year output (respectively, energy) 
share of each sector. When the formulas in section 4.2 are used to estimate the 
future rate of decline in overall energy intensity, then the one-to-one 
correspondence between the future output and energy shares can be used to 
eliminate scenarios involving unlikely values for either sectoral share. 
An important finding of our paper is the manner in which the upstream 
electricity generation sector acts as a drag on the ability of the overall energy 
intensity rate to decline rapidly. If energy efficiency improvements in the 
electricity generation sector are small (as predicted), then even very large 
improvements in energy efficiency in the other end-use sectors are not enough to 
make the overall energy intensity rate decline rapidly. Using the Lightfoot-Green 
(2001) estimates of maximum attainable energy efficiency improvements, we find 
that global average energy intensity decline will most likely be in the range of 0.9 
to 1.2 percent per annum over the course of the 21 st century. 
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Table 4.1: Global Energy Intensity Decline Estimate 
1 2 3 4 
Primary Energy Output 
Sector energy efficiency share 
share in improvement in 
19901 (1990-2100)2 19903 
(Zi) (Si) (gi) 
Electricity 37.5 85 4 Generation 
Transportation 18.6 200 6 
Residential 12.1 300 5 
Industrial 21.9 200 36 
Commercial 9.9 200 49 
Total 100 100 
Notes: 
1 Computed by Lightfoot and Green (2001) using ElA data. 
2 Estimated by Lightfoot and Green (2001). 
(ail figures in %) 
5 6 
Output Implied 
share primary 
in energy 
21004 share in 
21005 
(g;) (z;) 
3 44.1 
7 21 
3 5.3 
32 18.8 
55 10.8 
100 100 
3 Computed by us using World Bank (World Development Report. 2000) data. Suitable 
adjustments have been made to match the EIA's energy sectors with the World Bank's output 
sectors (see Appendix 4.2). 
4 Assumed. 
5 Calculated using equation (4.4). 
E'IY' 
Energy Intensity Ratio --= 0.344 
ElY 
Average Rate ofOverall Energy Intensity Decline (1990-2100) = 0.96 percent per 
annum 
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Table 4.2: Sensitivity Analyses: Likely (A, B & C) and Unlikely (D, F & G) 
Scenarios 
(ail numbers in percentage) 
GDP Share, g; (Implied Primary Energy Share, z;) 
1 2 3 4 in 2100 
Primary Energy Output 
Energy Efficiency Share in 
Share in Improvement 1990 
Sector 1990 (1990-2100) A B C D F G 
(z;) (Si) (gi) 
Electricity 3 2.7 2.5 6 1 0.1 
37.5 85 4 
Generation (41.2) (44.1) (39.4) (56.3) (21.5) (2.2) 
Transportation 18.6 200 6 10 5.3 7.5 10 4 9 
(28) (17.7) (24.1) (19.2) (17.5) (40.1) 
Residential 12.1 300 5 4 4 3 5 4 6 
(6.6) (7.8) (5.6) (5.6) (10.3) (15.6) 
Industrial 21.9 200 36 25 26 30 36 43 30 
(13.7) (17.0) (18.9) (13.5) (37.0) (26.2) 
Commercial 9.9 200 49 58 62 57 43 48 54.9 
(10.6) (13.5) (11.9) (5.4) (13.7) (15.9) 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
E'IY' 
Energy Intensity Ratio --
ElY 0.369 0.31 0.322 0.54 0.236 0.232 
Average Annual Rate of Energy Intensity Decline. 1990- 0.9 /.05 1.03 0.56 1.3 /.32 
2/00 
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Table 4.3: Sensitivity Analysis: Very Large Energy Efficiency Improvements 
in Downstream End-use Sectors 
1 2 3 
Primary Energy 
Sector energy efficiency 
share in improvement 
1990 (1990-2100) 
(z;) (s;) 
Electricity 
37.5 85 
Generation 
Transportation 18.6 400 
Residential 12.1 600 
Industrial 21.9 400 
Commercial 9.9 600 
Total 100 
E'IY' 
Energy Intensity Ratio --= 0.261 
ElY 
(ail figures in %) 
4 5 6 
Output Output Implied 
share share primary 
in 1990 in 2100 energy 
share in 
2100 
(g;) (g;) (z;) 
4 3 54.1 
6 7 19.3 
5 3 3.7 
36 32 17.3 
49 55 5.6 
100 100 100 
Average Rate ofOverall Energy Intensity Decline (1990-2100) = 1.21 percent per 
annum 
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Appendix 4.1: The Problem with EIA's Methodology 
ln this appendix we point out the deficiency with EIA's (1995) methodology for 
calculating the decline in overall energy intensity. As mentioned, the ElA report 
estimated the energy intensity of four "energy end-use" sectors of the US 
economy - transportation, residential, industrial and commercial - by devising 
suitable indicators. It then proceeded to measure the changes in the economy-wide 
energy intensity level, in the following manner: "For any given period oftime, an 
economy-wide energy-intensity indicator can be developed by weighing each of 
the sectoral changes in each of the indicators by the percent share of total 
consumption that each sector ho Ids" (ElA, 1995, p. 66). The weights used were 
the share of total energy consumption by each sector in thejinal year. To ilIustrate 
their methodology, the ElA report gave the following numerical example:120 
Table 4.4: Economy-wide Energy Intensity Calculation for the US (1980-
1990) 
Sectors Share of Total Energy Consumption % Change in Intensity 
(1990) (1980-1990) 
Residential 0.15 -2 
Commercial 0.11 -2 
Industrial 0.37 -4 
Transportation 0.37 -3 
Source: ElA (1995), p. 66 
120 ElA did not explicitly include an electricity generation sector. However, they converted site 
energy into primary energy by using "primary conversion factors", in order to account for losses in 
production, transmission and distribution of electricity. 
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The ElA calculated the percentage change in economy-wide energy 
intensity as the "multiplicative sum of percent share by percent intensity change": 
0.15(-2) + 0.11(-2) + 0.37(-4) + 0.37(-3) = -3.1. 
EIA's above methodology for computing the economy-wide energy 
intensity decline rate is, however, incorrect. In terms of notations defined in 
sectIon 4.2, what ElA actually measured IS L ~ _, __ , -1 = LZ; -- -1 , • • 4 e' (el 1 y' ) 4 (1 ) 
,=1 E e j 1 Y j ,=1 1 + Sj 
which is not equal to (E' 1 Y' -1) = R, the variable they wanted to measure. In 
ElY 
fact, as shown in equation (4.5), the ElA would require additional data on the 
output (gj) and energy (zJ shares of the four sectors in 1980, in order to 
correctly measure the overall energy intensity decline rate. 
Appendix 4.2: 1990 GDP Shares for the Energy End-use Sectors 
Global data for sectoral GDP shares is supplied by the World Bank and is 
available in their World Development Report (2000). Sectoral GDP share data, by 
country and for the world, is broken into three broad groups: agriculture, 
industrial, and services. Data is also supplied for manufacturing - the main sub-
sector in the "industrial" group. The three broad sectors include the following: 
"agriculture" also includes forestry and fishing; "industrial" includes, in addition 
to manufacturing, mining, construction, and electricity, gas and water supply. 
"Services" is ail the rest, including retai! and wholesale trade, transportation 
services, housing services, personal and professional services, tinancial services 
along with insurance and real estate, and government (allievels). 
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The World Bank output sectors are defined differently from the US 
Energy Information Administration's (ElA) energy sectors. Energy shares are 
needed for the following energy end-use sectors: electricity generation, 
transportation, residential, industrial, and commercial. To match the sectoral 
output and energy shares required us to make two main adjustments. First, we 
pu lied electricity supply out from the industrial output group, while subsuming 
agriculture, forestry and fishing in the energy sectoral industrial grouping. 
Second, we pulled transportation and household (mainly housing) services out of 
the output "services" group. Table 4.5 below illustrates. 
Since our initial year (1990) output share numbers for the different energy 
end-use sectors are approximations, we investigated the sensitivity of the overall 
energy intensity decline rate to variations in initial year output shares, and found 
that the former is not at ail sensitive to the latter. 
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Table 4.5: 1990 GDP Shares for the Energy End-use Sectors 
World Bank GDP Share (1990) 
Agriculture (including forestry, fishing) (6%) 
Industrial (34%) 
Electricity (4%), gas, water supply 
Manufacturing } 
Mining 
Construction 
Services (60%) 
Transportation service 
Household services (5%) 
Retail and wholesale trade } 
Personal and Professional 
Finance, insurance and real estate 
ElA Energy Groups 
Electricity Generation 
Industrial 
• Transportation 
• Residential 
• Commercial 
GDP Shares corresponding to 
ElA Energy Share Group 
4%a 
36% b 
6% c 
5% c 
49%d 
100% 
a The electricity generation share ofGDP was calculated using World Bank data on kwh per capita and population (in 1990) and an assumed price of tOc per kwh. A further 
assumption is that the value added of the electricity generation sector is 80% of the revenue it generated. 
b 34% (World Bank "industriaI" + 6% agriculture - 4% electricity generation = 36%. 
C Because global output shares for transportation and household (residential) GDP are lacking, we used Canadian data for the tormer and US data for the latter. 
d 60% (World Bank "services") - 6% (transportation) - 5% (residential) = 49%. 
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Conclusion 
The first essay analyzes the problem of pollution taxation under capital mobility and 
imperfect competition. We show that when countries cannot credibly pre-commit to 
their pollution tax rate, and have to set a time-consistent tax rate, location (like R&D) 
can be a strategie choice variable available to a polluting firm. Specifically, we model 
the location decision of a polluting monopolist between two competing countries. 
The non-cooperative Nash equilibrium depends not only on the values of parameters 
like marginal cost, fixed cost, and intensity of pollution damage, but also on the 
ability (or lack thereof) of the countries to pre-commit to their pollution tax rate. 
When tax is the only instrument used by the countries towards the firm, and the 
countrÏes can pre-commit to their tax rate, "race-to-the-bottom" tax competition 
between them al ways takes place, and the firm always locates in a single country. 
However, when the countries cannot pre-commit to their tax rate before the 
firm takes its location decision, the firm is able to take its location decision 
strategically. Instead of locating in a single country, the firm may set up a plant in 
each country - although the latter involves a higher fixed cost, it also decreases the 
"rent capture effect" of the tax subsequently faced by the firm. We show that if the 
fixed cost is small enough, the firm will indeed follow such a strategy. 
If instead of using pollution tax only, the countries use two instruments (a 
lump-sum subsidy and the pollution tax) in order to attract the firm, the firm could 
still strategically reject the subsidy and locate in both countries in order to benefit 
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from lower taxes. This would happen when the countries are unable to pre-commit to 
their tax rate, and the firm's fixed cost is sufficiently small. 
A second important finding of the first essay is that pre-commitment taxation 
can be better or worse for the countries (it is always better for the firm). Ability to 
credibly pre-commit to their pollution tax rate enables the countries to use the tax to 
compete with each other in the first stage (before the firm locates). When tax is the 
only instrument used, a pre-commitment tax policy mostly makes the countries worse 
off as compared to time-consistent taxation. Only the country, where no production 
takes place under time-consistent taxation, is better off under pre-commitment 
taxation. 
When both instruments are used, the pre-commitment tax policy mostly 
makes the countries better off than time-consistent taxation. This is because 
whenever they compete for the firm, the countries can only be better off using two 
instruments rather than one. The exception to this result is when the fixed cost is very 
small, in which case subsidy competition between countries takes place under pre-
commitment taxation but not under time consistent taxation. 
The second essay shows that the impact of liberalization on bureaucratic 
corruption may be non-monotonic. In the presence of monitoring by a regulating 
(anti-corruption) agency, an increase in economic openness has two opposing effects 
on corruptible inspectors who enforce an environmental regulation on firms. There is 
a "benefit effect" to the inspectors, as bribery becomes a more "desirable" option in 
the face of greater variety in consumption. As more consumption goods become 
available, the marginal utility of a bribe increases, which induces more inspectors to 
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become corrupt. On the other hand, greater openness also results in greater 
international pressures on the government to crack down on corruption (or pollution). 
This raises deterrence activity by the regulator, and the cost of expected penalty to 
inspectors and firms. This "co st effect" leads to Jess corruption. When the level of 
corruption is low, the "benefit effect" exceeds the "co st effect", and corruption rises 
with increasing openness. However, when the level of corruption exceeds a threshoJd, 
the "cost effect" dominates the "benefit effect", and corruption decreases with 
openness. The result is an "inverted-U" curve in corruption. 
Pre-commitment by the regulator to her monitoring frequency is shown to 
have a detrimental effect on corruption. This is because by pre-committing, the 
regulator is able to not only detect corrupt inspectors (which the regulator is able to 
do even when she cannot pre-commit), but also reduce the inspectors' incentive to be 
corrupt in the first place. 
The third essay analyzes the optimality of different labeling policies for 
credence goods when firms can cheat with respect to the label carried by their 
products. Labeling as an information disclosure mechanism becomes important when 
consumers care about an attribute ofa product that is unobservable to them. We show 
that, if firms honestly implement the labeling policy, then the government should 
impose costlY third party labeling requirement on the brown firms if and only if the 
brown good's market share under complete information is below a threshold (ê). Of 
course, if firms always label honestly, the self-labeling policy would trivially lead to 
the first best outcome, and would be most preferable. 
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More realistically, when firms can be corrupt in their implementation of the 
public labeling policy, the government will have to undertake random and costly 
monitoring of firms in order to deter brown firms from cheating and pretending to be 
green. In such a situation, we show that costly third party labeling may have to be 
imposed on the brown firms even if their complete information market share 
~ 
exceeded e . As weil, we find that imposing mandatory self-Iabeling requirement on 
brown firms is better than imposing mandatory third party labeling on them. Self-
labeling by brown and/or green firms is also preferable to costly third party labeling 
by green firms, unless the "market share effect" greatly exceeds the "incentive-to-
cheat effect", and the government has to monitor many more firms under self-
labeling. 
The fourth essay develops exact formulas for computing the global economy-
wide weighted average energy intensity decline associated with estimates of sectoral 
energy efficiency improvements, and shifts in sectoral output shares. We show that in 
order to compute the rate of decline in overall energy intensity over a period of time, 
information is needed about (i) initial year energy (or output) share of each sector, (ii) 
the energy efficiency improvements in each sector, and (iii) the ratio of final year to 
initial year output (or energy) share of each sector. When the formulas are used to 
estimate the future rate of decline in overall energy intensity, then the one-to-one 
correspondence between the future output and energy shares can be used to eliminate 
scenarios involving unlikely values for either sectoral share. 
An important finding of the fourth essay is the manner in which the electricity 
generation sector acts as a drag on the ability of the overall energy intensity rate to 
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decline rapidly. If energy efficiency improvements in the upstream electricity 
generation sector are small (as predicted), then even very large improvements in 
energy efficiency in the other end-use sectors are not enough to make the overall 
energy intensity rate decline rapidly. Using the Lightfoot-Green (2001) estimates of 
maximum attainable energy efficiency improvements, we find that global average 
energy intensity decline will most likely be in the range of 0.9 to 1.2 percent per 
annum over the course of the 21 st century. 
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